Vol. 5, No. 4 - Education Next https://www.educationnext.org/journal/vol-05-no-04/ A Journal of Opinion and Research About Education Policy Thu, 18 Jan 2024 16:48:17 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.5 https://i0.wp.com/www.educationnext.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/e-logo.png?fit=32%2C32&ssl=1 Vol. 5, No. 4 - Education Next https://www.educationnext.org/journal/vol-05-no-04/ 32 32 181792879 Findings from the City of Big Shoulders https://www.educationnext.org/findingsfromthecityofbigshoulders/ Sun, 29 Nov 2009 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.educationnext.org/findingsfromthecityofbigshoulders/ Younger Students Learn More in Charter Schools

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The number of charter schools has grown very rapidly in the United States, from essentially none in 1990 to more than 3,400 today. Supporters believe that the flexibility granted these new public schools allows them to be more innovative and responsive to student needs than traditional public schools are. And the fact that no student attends a charter school unless his parents want to keep him there means that families can “vote with their feet.” When a parent leaves a charter, so does the funding associated with his child. Thus a charter school cannot survive without satisfied parents. But charter schools do not just answer to parents; they must also persuade an authorizer to recharter them every few years, and they must participate in statewide testing and accountability. Will this concoction of flexibility, answering to parents, and accountability to the government raise school quality? Bluntly put, do students in charter schools learn more than their counterparts in traditional public schools? More than they would have learned had they stayed put?

A Lottery-Based Evaluation of Charter Schools

Getting a reliable answer to these questions is vital to the current policy debate, but researchers who try to answer them face considerable obstacles. First and foremost, most charter schools are new and small. They just don’t yet have enough results for researchers to draw conclusions. Second, although all charter schools share the features mentioned above, they are otherwise a diverse lot. Many set up shop in urban areas, serve minority and low-income students, and rely on a strategy and curriculum associated with an education management organization. However, some charter schools serve very rural, mostly white students. Some are run as start-ups by parent or community groups that do not associate themselves with a particular strategy or curriculum. Even within the world of education management organizations, approaches to learning can differ substantially. In short, an assessment of some charter schools is useful for learning about similar charter schools, but we should not expect it to inform us about all charter schools.

Even when researchers can evaluate charter schools that are large enough to contribute useful results to a study, old enough to have a track record, and representative of a substantial share of all charter schools, they face a daunting analytical challenge: finding students in the regular public schools who are truly comparable to the charter school students. Students who apply to attend charter schools are a self-selected group, and simply comparing them with all other students in local public schools is likely to be misleading. We do not even know whether to expect self-selection to work for or against charter schools. On the one hand, parents who try out charter schools may be especially motivated. On the other hand, parents whose children are doing well may avoid being “guinea pigs” in relatively untried schools.

In our study, we overcome this challenge by exploiting a feature common to most charter schools: the lottery that schools use to admit students when they have more applicants than spaces. Such lotteries present an opportunity, rare in education, to conduct randomized experiments of the type more commonly used in medical research.

We use this lottery-based approach to evaluate three schools managed by the Chicago Charter School Foundation (CCSF). Our treatment group (those who, in medicine, would receive the pill) comprises charter school applicants who drew a lottery number that earned them a place at one of the charter schools (lotteried in). Our control group (those who would receive the placebo) comprises the applicants who were lotteried out. All told, the study focuses on 2,448 students who are divided between the lotteried-in and lotteried-out groups. It’s important to realize that all of the students in the study applied to charter schools, so self-selection is the same for all of them. All that distinguishes the groups is their randomly drawn lottery numbers, so we can be confident that the groups are comparable not only in observable ways (like race and income), but also in less tangible ways, such as motivation to succeed. Currently, we can compare the progress of both groups for up to four years following their application. We are continuing the study and will report further results as they become available.

Our results to date, which indicate clear positive effects of attending a charter school on the math and reading test scores of students who enter charter schools in kindergarten through 5th grade, represent the most credible evidence yet available on how charter schools affect student achievement. They are also uniquely informative for policymaking. In the long run, as charter schools become more established, almost all of their students will have entered in the early grades. Policymakers should therefore assign greater weight to studies that focus on such students than they do to studies that, because they lack experimental data, must focus on atypical students who enter charter schools when they are older.

The Chicago Charter School Foundation

Chicago is home to almost all the charter school students (8,817 of 9,980) in Illinois. Charter schools in Illinois are free to establish their own missions and curricula, but they participate in the state accountability system and must abide by personnel restrictions similar to those of regular public schools. In Chicago, charter schools receive a per-student fee equal to only 75 percent of the average per-pupil operating spending in traditional public schools. For the 2003–04 school year, it was $5,279.

The Chicago Charter School Foundation is a charitable organization that has been operating since 1997. It oversees five primary schools, one high school, and one K–12 school. Together, its schools enroll more than half of Chicago’s charter school students. Seats in the charter schools are in demand. In the spring of 2004, CCSF schools had 2.4 applicants for every student they could admit. Most CCSF schools are run by nonprofit education management organizations, but one is run by a for-profit organization.

Our current report relies on CCSF’s oldest schools, all of which have been in operation since the late 1990s and have produced enough results to be evaluated:  Longwood (K–12), with 1,200 students in Washington Heights; Bucktown (K–8), with 600 students in Logan Square; and Prairie (K–8), with 350 students in Roseland. Longwood is run by Edison Schools, which is for-profit, while Bucktown and Prairie are operated by the nonprofit American Quality Schools. Although these education management organizations differ somewhat, their strategies are fairly typical of organizations geared toward urban, disadvantaged children. They feature a structured school day and curriculum, combined with a family-oriented approach designed to get parents involved.

The charter schools we study are all located in neighborhoods where the population is disproportionately minority and poor, but the schools are not alike. Longwood is in a very black neighborhood, and 99 percent of its students are black. Bucktown and Prairie are in neighborhoods that are mixed ethnically, but they draw students who are disproportionately likely to be Hispanic and in need of bilingual education (see Figures 1a through 1c).

Note: Nearby public schools are schools within a three-mile radius of the respective charter school, with the exception of Prairie which draws from an Hispanic area with a smaller radius.

SOURCES: Consortium on Chicago School Research data and National Center for Education Statistics data

The charter school students are about as likely to be eligible for special education and for the free or reduced-price lunch program as are students in the regular Chicago public schools. It’s very important to use the regular public schools’ classifications of students into lunch program, special education, and bilingual education. Otherwise, the classifications could reflect differences in how often the charter schools place students in these programs rather than their students’ traits.

The effects of attending a charter school reported in any study can only safely be extrapolated to students and schools like those included in the study. The students in our study are urban, dominated by racial and ethnic minorities, and largely disadvantaged. All of the students in our study applied to a charter school, so our results pertain to students who want to attend charter schools. Of course, these are precisely the students in whom policymakers are interested. No one suggests that students who do not want to attend charter schools should be forced to enroll in them, so learning whether they would have done better or worse in such schools is irrelevant.

The CCSF Lotteries

The charter school lotteries we study are pretty standard. A separate lottery is held for each school and grade. For example, if Bucktown has 60 kindergarten places available for 120 applicants and five 2nd-grade places available for 25 applicants, there would be a kindergarten lottery and a 2nd-grade lottery. After a charter school’s first year of operating a particular grade, it is normal for the most places to be available in kindergarten. In each lottery, applications are assigned a random number and ordered according to it. Using this ordering, the places available in each grade in each school are filled. (If a student is lotteried in, then his or her siblings are also automatically granted a place if they apply in a subsequent year and in a grade for which there is space available.)

In this article, we focus on students who participated in the lotteries held in spring 2000, 2001, and 2002. The Consortium on Chicago School Research generously agreed to match as many of these students as was possible to the Chicago Public Schools’ student database using their names, dates of birth, and the school and grade they reported attending when they applied. These data provide us with information on achievement, as measured by the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS), before students applied and, even more crucially, with post-application achievement data for students who remained in Chicago’s regular public schools.

All students who enrolled in a charter school were matched to a Chicago Public Schools record, as were 73 percent of the charter school applicants who applied but did not enroll. We ultimately limit our analysis to the 2,448 of these students who applied from a Chicago public school or applied to kindergarten (and thus were not in any school when they applied). We do this because the correct comparison for a student who applies from a private school is a lotteried-out student who would not appear in the Chicago Public Schools database. Our results should therefore be interpreted as the effect of attending a CCSF charter school on students who would otherwise be attending a regular public school, not the effect on students who would otherwise be attending a private school.

Enrollment in Regular Public Schools

One oft-stated concern about charter schools is that they will draw away the highest-achieving students from the regular public schools around them. We can address this issue by comparing the prior test scores of charter school applicants in our data with the test scores of students in regular public schools in their neighborhoods (within three miles). This exercise assumes that students would attend local schools if charter schools did not exist. If this is basically correct, the comparisons give a sense of how a charter school’s existence affects regular public schools around it.

Longwood’s applicants, before applying to the charter school, had similar reading scores but lower math scores (5 percentile points lower) than other students in neighboring regular public schools. Bucktown’s applicants had similar reading scores but lower math scores (7 percentile points lower) compared with students in neighboring regular public schools. Applicants to Prairie score about the same in math as students in the neighboring regular public schools, but their reading scores are higher (4 percentile points higher). As we mentioned above, however, Prairie draws from a neighborhood with a smaller radius than the one we allow, and its students’ earlier scores are typical of that smaller neighborhood. In short, the charter schools draw students who are, on average, somewhat lower achieving than public school students in the neighborhoods where the schools are located (see Figure 1d). While the differences in incoming achievement are not dramatic, they certainly do not support the theory that charter schools drain regular public schools of their best, most-advantaged students. Remember that the above differences in earlier achievement do not affect our results because they are between applicants and nonapplicants. For our control group, we use lotteried-out applicants, not nonapplicants.

Attrition and Noncompliance

Some charter-school applicants do not comply with the treatment that the lottery “assigns” them. A small share of lotteried-in students do not actually enroll in a charter school. Instead, they enroll in a private school, a public school in another district, or—most often—continue in a regular Chicago public school. Also, some lotteried-out students do not continue to attend the Chicago public school from which they applied. They switch to a private school, a public school in another district, or even a different charter school.

Students who remain somewhere in the Chicago public school system (including charter schools) appear in our database, making them “observed noncompliers.” Accounting for observed noncompliance in a randomized experiment is a fairly simple matter; we can adjust the estimated effect of attending a charter school to reflect the fact that some lotteried-in students did not attend.

The remaining noncompliers, however, are not observed because they disappear from the database when, for instance, they move to a suburban school district or switch to a private school. Unobserved noncompliers (“attriters”) are a problem in a randomized study if the characteristics of students who attrite among the lotteried in are different from the characteristics of students who attrite among the lotteried out. Fortunately, this problem does not arise in our study: the patterns of attrition are very similar among lotteried-in and lotteried-out students. Most important, the lotteried-out students who attrite are neither higher nor lower scoring than the lotteried-in students who attrite. Thus our results should not be affected by the fact that we are not able to track every student through every postlottery school year.

Large Lotteries Work Best

CCSF followed careful procedures to ensure that their lotteries were truly random. But do randomized lotteries automatically generate treatment and control groups that are comparable? For the group of applicants as a whole, they apparently did. Looking at earlier test scores and demographic characteristics, we find no statistically significant differences between the lotteried-in and lotteried-out groups. And the fact that the groups are so similar in their outward traits suggests they are also similar in unobservable traits like motivation.

Yet in addition to checking whether the lotteried-in and lotteried-out students are comparable as whole groups, we also need to check that subgroups of students, sorted by the grade to which they applied, are comparable. That is, we need to check the comparability of lotteried-in and lotteried-out students who entered as, say, 2nd graders. The reason we need to check these subgroups is that separate lotteries were run for each grade of entry. To see this point, let’s consider a concrete example. Suppose that a school held a lottery among 100 applicants for 50 kindergarten places and held a lottery among 20 applicants for two 6th-grade places. For the same reason that flipping a coin 100 times would probably result in about 50 percent heads, randomization would probably ensure comparability between the 50 lotteried-in and 50 lotteried-out kindergarteners. But we can be much less confident about the 6th-grade lottery, even if we know it is random, because there are so few applicants and places. Randomization could easily produce two lotteried-in students who just happen to be quite different from the 18 lotteried-out students.

In fact, the example is close to the truth. We find that randomization does ensure comparable groups in grades at which quite a few students are admitted. However, randomization is insufficient to ensure comparable groups in grades of entry that are rarely used. Since most students start in charter schools in early grades (kindergarten and 1st grade alone account for about 50 percent of new students), there are comparable groups for students who enter in kindergarten through grade 5. The 6th, 7th, and 8th grades account for, respectively, only 8, 5, and 4 percent of all CCSF admittees, and higher grades account for even tinier percentages. Thus it should be no surprise that the lotteried-in and lotteried-out groups are not comparable for grades of entry like 6 through 12.

In short, we confidently estimate the effect of attending a charter school for students who enter kindergarten through grade 5. We cannot use the lottery-based method with any confidence to estimate the effect of attending a charter school on students who enter in atypical grades, like grades 6 through 12. This is a limitation, because we might be intellectually curious about how charter schools affect the rare student who enters as, say, a 12th grader. However, it is a limitation that is largely irrelevant to policymakers. Most charter school students will, by definition, enter in grades that are typical grades of entry.

Charter Schools and Student Achievement

Because our evaluation is based on data from a randomized assignment, our analytic strategy is relatively simple. In essence, we simply compare the achievement of lotteried-in and lotteried-out applicants through the spring of 2004, or up to four years following their initial application. The results we report are adjusted to reflect the fact that not all lotteried-in students enrolled in charter schools. They therefore represent the effect of actually attending a charter school, not simply of drawing a lottery number low enough to gain admission. To refine the comparison, we account for the slight differences in the observable traits, including earlier test scores, that emerged by chance between lotteried-in and lotteried-out applicants. This refinement makes little difference in practice because randomization ensured that the groups were comparable.

* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 10% level
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Consortium on Chicago School Research data

We find that students in charter schools outperformed a comparable group of lotteried-out students who remained in regular Chicago public schools by 5 to 6 percentile points in math and about 5 percentile points in reading. (See Figure 2.) These are the key results of our analysis, and they translate into gains of 2.5 to 3 points for each year spent in the charter schools. The results are based on students who enter charter schools in kindergarten through grade 5, the grades of entry for which we can confidently estimate effects. To put the gains in perspective, it may help to know that 5 to 6 percentile points is just under half of the gap between the average disadvantaged, minority student in Chicago public schools and the average middle-income, nonminority student in a suburban district. If the students continued to make such gains for each year they spent in charter schools (a big “if”), then the gap between the charter school students and their suburban counterparts would close entirely after about five years of school. Right now, such projections are necessarily very speculative, but they help to give some sense of the magnitude of the charter-school effect.

The Virtues of Randomized Experiments

While the small number of students entering charter schools in midstream grades, like grades 6 through 12, precludes our estimating effects for them, the resulting focus is on the whole desirable. After a charter school is established, the vast majority of its students enter in the early elementary grades; for the most part, places in higher grades become available only when a student leaves.

In contrast, the rareness of late-grade entry poses serious problems for value-added analyses of charter schools, such as that by Robert Bifulco and Helen Ladd, who study North Carolina charter schools (see “Results from the Tar Heel State”). Such studies, which compare the annual gains made by students in charter schools with the gains made by the same student while attending a traditional public school, draw only on the experiences of students who were tested for at least two years in the regular public schools before attending a charter school. Because they rely on state tests that are administered for the first time in the 3rd grade, almost all the students included entered charter schools in 5th grade or later. These students are most likely unrepresentative; after all, they are engaging in behavior that is rare.

The fact that 5th-grade entrants are rare is not accidental; it results from parents’ hesitancy to move children between schools. Logic would suggest that students who are moved midstream are more likely to be struggling socially or academically, and any such differences would cause results based on their experience to be misleading. It is dangerous to apply such results to more typical charter-school students, and it is wrong to portray them as representative in the absence of independent evidence that they are.

Our own data set can provide some indication of the magnitude of the problem. Fifth-grade entrants comprise only 13 percent of CCSF’s total admittees and only about 6 percent of the admittees in our analysis, which excludes applicants from private schools and does not include charter schools that are in their first year of operation. If we limit the analysis to the 5th-grade applicants for whom we can compute value-added estimates, the number of student-year observations included immediately falls by about 85 percent. If we use standard value-added methods to estimate the effects of attending a charter school for these students, the results do not match well with those of our lottery-based analysis. In short, studies that use value-added methods to evaluate charter schools are at best misleading. The students included are too atypical for the results to be interpreted in a straightforward way.

Conclusion

We have analyzed established charter schools in Chicago that are overseen by the Chicago Charter School Foundation. Our results demonstrate that, among students who enter in a typical grade, attending a charter school improves reading and math scores by an amount that is both statistically and substantively significant. We believe that these results can safely be extrapolated to similar schools that serve similar students. In particular, the results are most useful for understanding the effects of charter schools run by education-management organizations on student populations that comprise largely low-income and racial/ethnic minorities. We cannot confidently extrapolate the results to very different charter schools, students from very different backgrounds, or students who enter in atypical grades. Our results should be helpful for many policymakers who are concerned about urban students like those we study. However, we do not claim that the results are helpful for all policymakers.

Research on charter schools, like the schools themselves, is fairly new. We are not aware of any other studies that use lotteries to isolate the effects of attending a charter school. Standard value-added analyses, which are often used to evaluate charter schools, rely entirely on an unusual group of students who switch from regular public schools to charter schools late in their elementary-school careers. Our analysis confirms that estimates of the effects of attending a charter school that rely on this peculiar group of students differ dramatically from estimates that are representative of students who apply to charter schools.

These differences probably stem from the tendency of parents to move children in the middle of elementary school only if they are already struggling. Thus we doubt that value-added analysis will ever produce results that have relevance beyond the peculiar set of students on which they depend. Evaluations of charter schools should rely on students who are typical of charter school applicants, not on students who are atypical. Randomization provides us with estimates that are inherently better than those based on value-added analysis.

Caroline M. Hoxby is professor of economics, Harvard University. Jonah E. Rockoff is assistant professor of economics and finance, Columbia Business School.

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Private Schools for the Poor https://www.educationnext.org/privateschoolsforthepoor/ Fri, 23 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.educationnext.org/privateschoolsforthepoor/ The post Private Schools for the Poor appeared first on Education Next.

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The accepted wisdom is that private schools serve the privileged; everyone else, especially the poor, requires public school. The poor, so this logic goes, need government assistance if they are to get a good education, which helps explain why, in the United States, many school choice enthusiasts believe that the only way the poor can get the education they deserve is through vouchers or charter schools, proxies for those better private or independent schools, paid for with public funds.

But if we reflect on these beliefs in a foreign context and observe low-income families in underprivileged and developing countries, we find these assumptions lacking: the poor have found remarkably innovative ways of helping themselves, educationally, and in some of the most destitute places on Earth have managed to nurture a large and growing industry of private schools for themselves.

For the past two years I have overseen research on such schools in India, China, and sub-Saharan Africa. The project, funded by the John Templeton Foundation, was inspired by a serendipitous discovery of mine while I was engaged in some consulting work for the International Finance Corporation, the private finance arm of the World Bank. Taking time off from evaluating an elite private school in Hyderabad, India, I stumbled on a crowd of private schools in slums behind the Charminar, the 16th-century tourist attraction in the central city. It was something that I had never imagined, and I immediately began to wonder whether private schools serving the poor could be found in other countries. That question eventually took me to five countries—Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, India, and China—and to dozens of different rural and urban locales, all incredibly poor. Since the data gathered from Lagos, Nigeria, and Delhi, India, are not yet fully analyzed, this article reports on findings only from Gansu Province, China; Ga, Ghana; Hyderabad, India; and Kibera, Kenya. These are in vastly different settings, but my research teams and I found large numbers of private schools for low-income families, many of which showed measurable achievement advantage over government schools serving equally disadvantaged students.

 

Myth One: Private Education for the Poor Does Not Exist

Undertaking this research was disheartening at first. In each country I visited, officials from national governments and international agencies that donate funds for the expansion of state-run education denied
that private education for the poor even
existed. In China senior officials told me that what I was describing was “logically impossible” because “China has achieved universal public education and universal means for the poor as well as the rich.” At other times, in other places, I met with polite, if embarrassed, apologies that always went something like, “Sorry, in our country, private schools are for the privileged, not the poor.”

In each venue, however, I struck out on my own and visited slums and villages and there found what I was looking for: private schools for the poor, usually in large numbers, if sometimes hidden from view. In the slums of Hyderabad, India, a typical private school would be in a converted house, in a small alleyway behind bustling and noisy streets, or above a shop. Classrooms are dark, by Western standards, with no doors hung in the doorways, and noise from the streets outside easily entering through the barred but unglazed windows. Walls are painted white, but discolored by pollution, heat, and the general wear-and-tear of the children; no pictures or work is hung on them. Children will usually be in a school uniform and sitting at rough wooden desks. Generally, there are about 25 students in a class, a decent teacher-to-student ratio, but the tiny rooms always seem crowded. Often the top floor of the building will have various construction work going on to extend the number of classrooms. The school proprietor will usually live in a couple of rooms at the back of the building.

In rural Ghana, a typical private school might consist of an open-air structure, often no more than a tin roof supported by wooden poles, on a small plot of land. To find these schools you’ll have to wander down meandering narrow paths, away from the main thoroughfares, asking villagers as you go. If you ask simply for the “school,” they’ll send you back to the public school, usually an impressive brick building on the main road. You’ll have to persist and say you want the “small” school to get directions.


In the slums of Nairobi, Kenya, private schools are made from the same materials as every other building: corrugated iron sheets or mud walls, with windows and doors cut out to allow light to enter. Floors are usually mud, roofs sometimes thatched. Children will not be in uniform and will usually be sitting on homemade wooden benches. In the dry season, the wind will blow dust through the cracks in the walls; in the rainy season, the playground will become a pond, and the classroom floors mud baths. Teaching continues, however, through most of these intemperate interruptions.

In order to conduct research in five countries from my base in Newcastle, England, I recruited teams of researchers from reputable local universities and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). While fielding the research crews, I visited dozens of likely study sites, always in low-income areas, and always found private schools for the poor. I also visited government offices to gain permission to conduct the research. In the end, all of the chosen countries, apart from China, were rated by the Oxfam Education Report as countries where education needs were not being met by government systems. Though China is ranked relatively high on the Oxfam index, we wanted to include it in our study because of the dramatic political and economic changes there in the past several decades. (Because of the threat of SARS, however, our first research team spent a long period in quarantine and thus our research there is not yet complete.) Other countries
were chosen for a mixture of practical and substantive reasons. I was particularly interested in Kenya, where free elementary education had just been introduced to much acclaim. How would this affect private schools for the poor, should they exist? I had conducted research earlier in Hyderabad, India, was familiar with the terrain, and had many contacts in government and the private sector, so it seemed sensible to continue the project there. And because of a chance meeting with the Ghanaian minister of education at a conference in Italy, we were invited to that western African nation.

Many difficulties emerged that I had not taken account of as the project progressed. Heavy rains prevented the research teams from moving around in both Ghana and Nigeria for weeks at a time; intense heat delayed work for days in Hyderabad; early snowfalls hampered movement in the mountains of China. But above all, a major difficulty was getting the extended research teams to take seriously the notion that we really were interested in the low-key, unobtrusive private schools that apparently were easily dismissed. In each of the settings, on unannounced quality control visits, I found unrecognized private schools that had not been reported by the teams.

 

Hyderabad, India

Visit the ultramodern high-rise development of “High Tech City” and you’ll see why Hyderabad dubs itself “Cyberabad,” proud of its position at the forefront of India’s technological revolution. But cross the river Musi and enter the Old City, with once magnificent buildings dating to the 16th century and earlier, and you’ll see the congested India, with narrow streets weaving their way through crowded markets and densely populated slums. For our survey, we canvassed three zones in the Old City (Bandlaguda, Bhadurpura, and Charminar), with a population of about 800,000 (about 22 percent of all of Hyderabad), covering an area of some 19 square miles. We included only schools that were found in “slums,” as determined by the latest available census and Hyderabad municipal guides, areas that lacked amenities such as indoor plumbing, running water, electricity, and paved roads.

In these areas alone our team found 918 schools: 35 percent were government run; 23 percent were private schools that had official recognition by the government (“recognized”); and, incredibly, 37 percent slipped
under the government radar (“unrecognized”). The last group is, in effect, a black market in education, operating entirely without both state funding
and regulation. (The remaining 5 percent were private schools that received a 100 percent state subsidy for teachers’ salaries, making them public schools in all but name.) In terms of total student enrollment in the slum areas of the three zones, with 918 schools, 76 percent of all schoolchildren attended either recognized or unrecognized private schools, with roughly the same percentage of children in the unrecognized private schools as in government schools (see Figure 1).

SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on original research and local government figures.


SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on original research and local government figures.

What is clear from our research is that these private schools are not mom-and-pop day-care centers or living-room home schools. The average unrecognized school had about 8 teachers and 170 children, two-thirds in rented buildings of the type described above. The average recognized school was larger and usually situated in a more comfortable building, with 18 teachers and about 490 children. Another key difference between the recognized and unrecognized schools is that the former have stood the test of time in the education market: 40 percent of unrecognized schools were less than 5 years old, while only 5 percent of recognized schools were this new. Finally, tuition in these schools is very low, averaging about $2.12 per month in recognized private schools at 1st grade and $1.51 in unrecognized schools.

While these fees seem extremely low, they must be measured against the average income of each person in the student’s household who is working for pay. For students in unrecognized schools, this was about $23 per month, compared with about $30 per month for students in recognized schools and $17 for government schools. Since the official minimum wage in Hyderabad is $46 per month, it is clear that the families in the private schools we observed are poor. Fees amount to about 7 percent of average monthly earnings in a typical household using a private unrecognized school. For the poorest children, the schools provide scholarships or subsidized places: 7 percent of children paid no tuition and 11 percent paid reduced fees. In effect, the poor are subsidizing the poorest.

Ga, Ghana

The Ga district of southern Ghana, which surrounds the country’s capital city of Accra, is classified by the Ghana Statistical Service as a low-income, urban periphery, and rural area. With a population of about 500,000, Ga includes poor fishing villages along the coast, subsistence farms inland, and large dormitory towns for workers serving the industries and businesses of Accra itself. Most of the district lacks basic social amenities such as potable water, sewage systems, electricity, and paved roads. In Ga’s towns and villages our researchers found a total of 799 schools, 25 percent of which were government, 52 percent recognized private, and 23 percent unrecognized private. In total, 33,134 children were found in unrecognized private schools, or about 15 percent of children enrolled in school (see Figure 2).

The average monthly fee for an unrecognized private school in Ga is about $4 for the early elementary grades, about $7 in recognized schools. With a minimum wage of about $33 per month in the area, monthly fees in the private unrecognized schools are thus about 12 percent of the average monthly earnings of an adult earner. However, many of the poorest schools allow a daily fee to be paid so that, for instance, a poor fisherman could send his daughter to school on the days he had funds and allow her to make up for the days she missed. Such flexibility is not possible in the public schools, where full payment of the “levies” is required before the term starts. (Fees for “public” schools are common in many countries throughout the Third World, especially at high-school level. Thus the cost of private schools, we found, can sometimes be less than that of government ones.)

Unlike India, where there are restrictions on private-school ownership (private schools must be owned by a society or trust), in Ga the vast majority of private schools (82 percent of recognized and 93 percent of unrecognized) are run by individual proprietors; most of the rest are owned and managed by charitable organizations. Sometimes, as is common in other African countries, such schools rent church buildings or use Christian-related names, but only in a few cases are the schools run by churches. Often it is the school that subsidizes the church rather than the other way around!

Gansu, China

With 25.3 million people spread out over an area the size of Texas, Gansu province is a remote and mountainous region situated on the upper and middle reaches of the Yellow River in northwest China. It has an average elevation of over 3,000 feet and 75 percent of its population is rural, with illiteracy rates among people aged 15 or older at nearly 20 percent for men and 40 percent for women. Roughly half of its counties, with 62 percent of the population, are considered “impoverished.”

Figures from the Provincial Education Bureau show only 44 private schools in the whole province, all of which are for privileged city dwellers. Given the paucity of information on private schools, I asked my research teams to survey each major town in each of the counties designated as impoverished (more than 40 of them) and to visit as many of the outlying villages accessible to them as they could. In the early stages I wasn’t worried about getting precise estimates of the numbers of schools or the proportion of children in them, but rather wanted to see if such schools even existed.

In the major towns and the larger villages, all of them crowded and bustling, there is always a public school, usually a fine two-story building that sports a plaque marking it as a recipient of some kind of foreign aid. But researchers had to abandon their cars and either walk or hitch a ride on one of the ubiquitous and noisy three-wheeled farm vehicles to travel up the steeper mountain paths to clusters of houses in smaller villages to find the private schools. And there, nestled on mountain ridges, were stone or brick houses converted to schools, with the proprietor or headmaster living with his family in one or two of its rooms. Occasionally, the school had been built, by the villagers, to be used as a school. Over and over again, researchers followed these trails high into the arid mountains and, in the end, discovered a total of 696 private schools, 593 of them serving some 61,000 children in the most remote villages.

Not surprisingly, the vast majority of Gansu’s private schools were set up by individuals, or the villages themselves, because government schools are simply too far away or hard to get to. Significantly, the majority of the private schools found were in the three poorest regions of Gansu, where average net income per year ranges from $125 to $166. These private schools are serving some of the poorest people on the planet. But surprisingly, the schools, which depend on tuition, are also cheaper than government schools. Average fees for a first-year, elementary-school student are about $7.60 per semester, compared with about $8.00 in the public schools, not an insignificant difference to someone living on $125 per year.

Kibera, Kenya

In Kenya we conducted our censuses in three urban slums of Nairobi (Kibera, Mukuru, and Kawangware), where, according to Kenyan government officials, there were no private schools. The picture in each was similar; here I describe the findings for Kibera only.

The largest slum in all of sub-Saharan Africa, Kibera has, according to various estimates, anywhere from 500,000 to 800,000 people crowded into an area of about 630 acres, smaller than Manhattan’s Central Park. Mud-walled, corrugated iron-roofed settlements huddle along the old Uganda Railway for several miles and crowd along steep narrow mud tracks until Kibera reaches the posh suburbs. In Nairobi’s two rainy seasons, the mud tracks become mud baths. In this setting, we found 76 private elementary and high schools, enrolling more than 12,000 students. The schools are typically run by local entrepreneurs, a third ofwhom are women who have seen the possibility of making a living from running a school. Again, many of the schools offered free places to the poorest, including orphans.

When I first visited Kibera, many private-school proprietors were feeling the effects of so-called Free Primary Education (FPE), introduced by the Kenyan government in January 2003 with great fanfare and a $55 million grant from the World Bank. In fact, when asked by ABC anchorman Peter Jennings which one living person he would most like to meet, former president Bill Clinton told a prime-time television audience that it was President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya, “Because he has abolished school fees,” which “would affect more lives than any president had done or would ever do by the end of this year.” Indeed, official sources estimated that an extra 1.3 million children would be enrolled in public schools after the introduction of FPE: all of them children, it was said, not previously enrolled in school.

The reality may be very different. Private-school owners in Kibera alone reported a total enrollment decline of some 6,500 after Free Primary Education was initiated; some schools closed altogether. We estimated that about 4,500 children had been enrolled in 25 schools that we confirmed had closed as a result of FPE. At the same time five government primary schools on the periphery of Kibera that served the slums reported a total increase of only about 3,300 children during this period. That is, since the introduction of free elementary education, there appeared to have been a net decline in attendance of nearly 8,000 children from one slum alone! Clearly, these figures are based on the reported decline by school owners and may be exaggerated. But they also suggest the possibility that government and international intervention had the effect of crowding out private enterprise.

Myth TWO: Private Education for the Poor Is Low Quality

It is a common assumption among development experts that private schools for the poor are worse than public schools. This is not to say that they have a particularly high view of public education. Indeed, the World Bank’s World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People calls public education a “government failure,” with “services so defective that their opportunity costs outweigh their benefits for most poor people.” Yet this just makes the experts’ dismissal of private schools for the poor all the more inexplicable.

The Oxfam Education Report published in 2000 is typical. While the author acknowledges the existence of high-quality private providers, he contends that these are elite, well-resourced schools that are inaccessible to the poor. As far as private schools for the poor are concerned, these are of “inferior quality”; indeed, they “offer a low-quality service” that is so bad it will “restrict children’s future opportunities.” This claim of low-quality private provision for the poor has also been taken up by British prime minister Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa, which recently reported that although “Non-state sectors … have historically provided much education in Africa,” many of these private schools “aiming at those [families] who cannot afford the fees common in state schools … are without adequate state regulation and are of a low quality.”

However, these development experts have little hard evidence for their assertions about private-school quality. They instead point out that private schools employ untrainedteachers who are paid much less than their government counterparts and that buildings and facilities are grossly inadequate. Both of these observations are largely true. But does that mean that private schools are inferior, particularly against the weight of parental preferences to the contrary? One Ghanaian school owner challenged me when I observed that her school building was little more than a corrugated iron roof on rickety poles and that the government school, just a few hundred yards away, was a smart new school building. “Education is not about buildings,” she scolded. “What matters is what is in the teacher’s heart. In our hearts, we love the children and do our best for them.” She left it open, when probed, what the teachers in the government school felt in their hearts toward the poor children.

 

Facilities and Resources

The issue of the relative quality of private and public schools was at the core of our research, and we relied on both data on school resources and day-to-day operations and on student achievement scores. Our researchers first called unannounced at schools and asked for a tour, noted what teachers were doing, made an inventory of facilities, and administered detailed questionnaires.

Certainly, in some countries the facilities in the private schools were markedly inferior to those in the public schools. In China, where the researchers were asked to locate a public school in the village nearest to where they had found a private school, often many miles away, private-school facilities were generally worse than in those publicly provided. This was predictable, given that the private schools undercut the public ones in fees and served the poorest villages, where there were no public schools. In Gansu province, desks were available in classrooms in 88 percent of private schools, compared with 97 percent of public schools; 66 percent of private schools had chairs or benches in classrooms, compared with 76 percent of public schools. In Kenya, parallel results would be expected, given that the private schools surveyed were located in the slums, while the public schools were on the periphery, accommodating both poor and middle-class children. However, given that there were only 5 government schools on the periphery of Kibera, but 76 private schools within the slum, statistical comparisons would make little sense.

In Hyderabad, however, on every input, including the provision of blackboards, playgrounds, desks, drinking water, toilets, and separate toilets for boys and girls, both types of private schools, recognized and unrecognized, were superior to the government schools. While only 78 percent of the government schools had blackboards in every classroom, the figures were 96 percent and 94 percent for private recognized and unrecognized schools, respectively. In only half the government schools were toilets provided for children, compared with 100 percent and 96 percent of the recognized and unrecognized private schools.

Finally, in Ghana, the picture is mixed. For instance, 95 percent of government schools in Ga had playgrounds, compared with 66 percent and 82 percent of private unrecognized and recognized schools, respectively. Desks were provided in 97 percent of government schools, but only in 61 percent of private unrecognized; recognized private schools provided them in 92 percent of cases. However, only 54 percent of government schools provided drinking water to children compared with 63 percent of private unrecognized and 87 percent of private recognized schools. And 63 percent of government schools provided toilets, compared with 91 percent of recognized but only 59 percent of unrecognized private schools. A library was provided in 8 percent of government, 7 percent of private unrecognized schools, but 27 percent of private recognized schools. At least one computer for the use of children was provided in only 3 percent of government schools, but in 12 percent of private unrecognized and 37 percent of private recognized.

When it came to the key question of whether or not teaching was going on in the classrooms, both types of private schools were superior to the public schools, except in China, where there was no statistically significant difference between the two school types: 92 percent of teachers in private schools were teaching when our researchers arrived, compared with 89 percent in the public schools. When researchers called unannounced on the classrooms in Hyderabad, 98 percent of teachers were teaching in the private recognized schools, compared with 91 percent in the unrecognized and 75 percent in the government schools. Teacher absenteeism was also highest in the government schools. In Ga, 57 percent of teachers were teaching in government schools, compared with 66 percent and 75 percent in unrecognized and recognized private schools, respectively. And in Kibera, even though the number of government schools is too small to make statistical comparisons meaningful, 74 percent of teachers were teaching in private schools when our researchers visited them, and only one teacher was absent.

It was also the case that private and public schools in China had more or less the same pupil-teacher ratio, about 25:1. In Hyderabad, private schools, including the unrecognized ones, had significant advantages over the government schools: the average pupil-teacher ratio was 42:1 in government schools compared with only 22:1 in the unrecognized and 27:1 in the recognized private schools. In Ga the pupil-teacher ratio was superior in private schools, with a ratio of 29:1 in government, compared with 21:1 and 20:1 in unrecognized and recognized private schools, respectively.


Student Achievement

To compare the achievement of students in public and private schools in each location where we conducted research, we first grouped schools by size and management type: government, private unrecognized, and private recognized in Ga and Hyderabad; government and private in Kibera, where the private schools are all of a similar type. (China is not discussed here because research there is continuing.) As noted above, in Ga and Hyderabad we were comparing public and private schools that were located in similar, low-income areas, while in Kibera, private schools served only slum children, and public schools served middle-class children as well as slum children. But this makes the comparisons in Kenya even more dramatic. Although serving the most disadvantaged population in the region, Kibera’s private schools outperformed the public schools in our study, after controlling for background variables.

We tested a total of roughly 3,000 students in each setting in English and mathematics; in state languages in India and Kenya; religious and moral education in Ghana; and social studies in Nigeria. All children were also given IQ tests, as were their teachers. Finally, questionnaires were distributed to children, their parents, teachers, and school managers, seeking information on family backgrounds.

Our analysis of these data is still in progress. However, in all cases analyzed so far—Ga, Hyderabad, and Kibera—students in private schools achieved at or above the levels achieved by their counterparts in government schools in both English and mathematics (see Figure 3).

SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on original research and local government figures

Moreover, the private-school advantage only increases with consideration of the differences in an unusually rich array of characteristics of the students, their families’ economic status, and the resources available at their schools. In Hyderabad, students attending recognized and unrecognized private schools outperformed their peers in government schools by a full standard deviation in both English and math (after accounting for differences in their observable characteristics). In Ghana, the adjusted private-school advantagewas between 0.2 and 0.3 standard deviations in both subjects. Finally, in Kenya, where the raw test scores showed students in private and public schools performing at similar levels, the fact that private schools served a far more disadvantaged population resulted in a gap of 0.1 standard deviations in English and 0.2 standard deviations in math (after accounting for differences in student characteristics). The adjusted differences between the performance of public and private sectors in each setting were highly statistically significant.

In short, it is not the case that private schools serving low-income families are inferior to those provided by the state. In all cases analyzed, even the unrecognized schools, those that are dismissed by the development experts as being obviously of poor quality seem to outperform their public counterparts.

Lessons for America

So the accepted wisdom appears to be wrong. Though elite private schools do exist in impoverished regions of the world, private schools are not only for the privileged classes. From a wide range of settings, from deepest rural China, through the slums of urban India and Kenya, to the urban periphery areas o Ghana, private education is serving huge numbers of children. Indeed, in those areas where we were able to adequately compare public and private provision, a large majority of schoolchildren are in private school, a significant number of them in unrecognized schools and not on the state’s radar at all.

Ironically, perhaps, the accepted wisdom does seem to be right on one point: private is better than public. Of course, no one suspected that private slum schools would be better. Yet our research suggests that children in these schools outperform similar students in government schools in key school subjects. And this is true even of the unrecognized private schools, schools that development experts dismiss, if they acknowledge their existence at all, as being of poor quality.

Clearly the evidence presented here may have implications for the continuing policy discussions over how to achieve universal education worldwide and for American development policy, especially programs of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank. William Easterly, in his Elusive Quest for Growth (see also “Barren Land,” Fall 2002), notes the ineffectiveness of past investments in public schools by the international agencies and developing country governments, pointing out: “Administrative targets for universal primary education do not in themselves create the incentives for investing in the future that matter for growth,” that is, in quality education. If the World Bank and USAID could find ways to invest in private schools, then genuine education improvement could result. Strategies to be considered include offering loans to help schools improve their infrastructure or worthwhile teacher training, or creating partial vouchers to help even more of the poor gain access to the private schools that are ready to take them on.

But does the evidence have any implications for the school choice debate in America itself? The evidence from developing countries might challenge the claim, made by school choice opponents, that the poor in America cannot make sensible and informed choices if school choice is offered to them. It may also stimulate debate about whether public intervention crowds out private initiative, a question raised by the findings from Kenya.
If a public school is failing in the ghettoes of New York or Los Angeles, we should not assume that the only way in which the disadvantaged can be helped is through some kind of public intervention. In fact, we have already embarked on programs that support private initiative, with government support, with vouchers and charter schools. The findings here suggest this alternative approach may be the preferable one.

Above all, the evidence should inspire those who are working for school choice in America: stories of parents’ overcoming all the odds to ensure the best for the children in Africa and Asia, stories of education entrepreneurs’ creating schools out of nothing, in the middle of nowhere. If India can, why can’t we?

 

James Tooley is professor of education policy, the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, England. This essay is supported by a grant from the John M. Templeton Foundation.

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Last February, in a speech in Washington, D.C. that drew 45 of the nation’s governors as well as a hefty sample of the nation’s education policy elite, Microsoft chairman Bill Gates issued a jeremiad on the state of the American high school, arguing that this venerable institution is obsolete and a threat to the nation’s economic and political well-being. Declarations that public education in general and high schools in particular turn out badly prepared graduates, perpetuate inequities, and generally operate in ways that run counter to the nation’s interests have become almost commonplace. But coming from Gates, whose prodigious wealth and aggressive tactics have become one of the nation’s best-known narratives of entrepreneurship, the words took on new meaning. Stories in the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and many other newspapers, most written not by education reporters but by Washington-based political and legislative correspondents, reported Gates’s assertions in an unquestioning, almost awestruck tone that made one thing clear: if high schools are bad enough for Bill Gates to declare them a disaster, then it must be so.

It was publicity that even the world’s richest man could not buy.

But Gates’s standing to speak authoritatively on the issue rested on more than his wealth, celebrity, and business acumen, or even his company’s need to hire well-trained workers. Through the efforts of his richly endowed Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Gates has become an unparalleled force who is not only sounding the alarm about America’s high schools, but is also putting forth, and financing, a range of specific solutions. Since 2002, the Gates Foundation has allocated more than $1.2 billion toward creating about 820 new high schools and breaking down about 750 large, comprehensive high schools into smaller, more focused, more intimate academies that aim to send far more students off to college prepared to succeed. The foundation is also the lead partner in a $125 million experiment in “early college” high schools, which are designed to enable 9th graders to get their high-school diplomas as well as two years of college credit, all within four or five years. To increase the impact of its initiatives, the Gates Foundation has involved 13 other foundations and is working with more than one hundred intermediary organizations in two hundred cities located in almost every state. The foundation’s goal is ambitious: to improve the national graduation rate to at least 80 percent, from about 65 percent, while increasing the likelihood that all high-school graduates are college-ready. So, more spending, in more places, is likely on the way.

The Money Pours In

American philanthropy, by local and national foundations, corporations, and wealthy individuals, has played many important roles in K–12 education: creating new schools, underwriting research, funding scholarships, testing hypotheses, generating new curricula, invoking ideals, setting agendas, bolstering training, and building a case for policy changes. Foundation money is so widespread, and so sought after, that few in education are unaffected. Indeed, institutions with which both this author and this journal are affiliated receive support from several foundations mentioned here.

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau; Jay Greene, “Buckets into the Sea: Why Philanthropy Isn’t Changing Schools, and How It Could,” prepared for American Enterprise Institute conference, “With the Best of Intentions: Lessons Learned in K–12 Education Philanthropy,” April 25, 2005, Washington, D.C.

Nothing about this is new. Thousands of schools for African American students across the Jim Crow South were built with the backing of the Rosenwald Fund, one of the earliest and most important foundations in education; philanthropist Grace Dodge founded Teachers College, now at Columbia University, in 1887, which led to training of teachers in pedagogy; the Ford Foundation was involved in promoting the employment of classroom aides, National Merit Scholarships, and the development of Advanced Placement curricula and tests; the National Board of Professional Teaching Standards grew out of work funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York, which also funded the Educational Testing Service to develop objective ways of measuring academic merit, which led to the SAT. More recently, Ford and the Rockefeller Foundation supported the work that led to equity lawsuits, dramatically altering how schools are funded in many states. Even if the $1.5 billion that philanthropists spend on K–12 education is paltry compared with the $450 billion annual price tag for the system as a whole, all of these are examples of the huge impact that well-placed philanthropy dollars can have (see Figure 1).

Even though some foundations have reduced their involvement in K–12 education or shifted their education investment to prekindergarten or afterschool programs, far more philanthropists are entering the scene than are leaving, says Bill Porter, executive director of Grantmakers for Education.

Indeed, according to the Future of Philanthropy project, an analysis done by a Cambridge, Massachusetts, consulting group, the number of foundations involved in education is expected to swell. Over the next two decades, Americans will pass on to their heirs huge sums, approximately $1.7 trillion of which will go to charities and to endow foundations. And, typically, about 25 percent of philanthropic dollars goes to education, although more goes to higher education than to elementary and secondary schools. Gates, just to use one example, has a personal net worth estimated by Forbes magazine to be $46 billion, and he has vowed to give away 95 percent of his assets during his lifetime.

The New Philanthropists

Plenty of other heavyweights in the world of business are contributing heavily to education causes already. They include Jim Barksdale, the former chief operating officer of Netscape, who gave $100 million to establish an institute to improve reading instruction in Mississippi; Eli Broad, the home builder and retirement investment titan, whose foundation works on a range of management, governance, and leadership issues; Michael Dell, the founder of Dell Computers, whose family foundation is valued at $1.2 billion and is a major supporter of a program that boosts college going among students of potential but middling accomplishment; financier and buyout specialist Theodore J. Forstmann, who gave $50 million of his own money to help poor kids attend private schools; David Packard, a former classics professor who also is a scion of one of the founders of Hewlett-Packard and has given $75 million to help California school districts improve reading instruction; and the Walton Family Foundation, which benefits from the fortune of the founder of Wal-Mart, and which is the nation’s largest supporter of charter schools and private school scholarships (see “A Tribute to John Walton,”).

As is clear from this partial list, many of the newcomers are in the West, or otherwise far from the old-money power centers of the East. A number of the individual donors did not come from money, but attended public schools before amassing their fortunes. As a group, they share a belief that public education has not done well by immigrants or poor students, hardly a radical claim. But they are less likely than were donors in the past to think that the solution to that problem lies solely or even primarily in spending more money or even in making the allocation of resources more equitable, which has been a common thread in work that many better-established foundations have pursued.

The San Francisco-based Pisces Foundation, for example, was endowed by Donald Fisher, founder and chairman emeritus of the Gap clothing chain, and his wife, Doris. By 2005 Pisces was the biggest single supporter of Teach for America, a nonprofit that has, improbably, made teaching in poverty-ridden urban schools one of the most popular career choices of students at Ivy League colleges. Pisces also gave about $35 million to fund the national expansion of the instructionally demanding Knowledge Is Power Program charter schools, which serve mostly low-income students. Overall, the foundation is spending about $20 million a year to “leverage change in public education—especially in schools serving disadvantaged students—through large strategic investments in a small number of initiatives that bolster student achievement.” That rate of spending was about the same as that of the venerable Carnegie Corporation and would have put the foundation in the top ten or so givers to K–12 in 2002. (See Table 1).

SOURCE: Jay Greene, “Buckets into the Sea: Why Philanthropy Isn’t Changing Schools, and How It Could”

Like Fisher, other new philanthropists tend to believe that schools, in addition to securing adequate financial resources, need to embrace accountability and to overhaul basic functions. Many are personally involved in overseeing the grants they give and they insist on results from educators and schools. They believe good leadership, effective management, compensation based on performance, competition, the targeting of resources, and accountability for results can all pay dividends for education as well as for foundations. They tend to set ambitious goals for their own work and to be aggressive in pursuit of their agendas. That, too, is something of a departure for philanthropists, who have tended to stay in the background and let their grantees set their own goals while they bask in the spotlight.

“These are people who made money challenging the status quo,” says Barry Munitz, president and CEO of the J. Paul Getty Trust, referring to the new givers. “These high net worth, first-generation folks…approach their gift-giving the way they approached their investing—due diligence, measures of accountability, a lot of involvement, each with an agenda. It’s very different from spending money on the system and standing back and letting it work.”

But it’s not always easy for foundations to manage the tradeoffs between aggressively pushing school districts in a certain direction and respecting the wishes of a community and its leadership; between demanding quick results and acknowledging the complexity of school reform and the intransigence of bureaucracies; between investing in something new and injecting operating resources into a project already under way. In thinking about these dilemmas, many in the philanthropic world continue to cite the 1993 Annenberg Challenge as an example of what they want to avoid.

The $500 million challenge issued by former ambassador and publishing mogul Walter Annenberg is still the largest philanthropic gift ever given to American public education. After being matched by more than $600 million in goods and services from the local communities that were recipients, the money was given to nine large city school systems, a consortium of rural schools, and two national school-reform groups, among others. In some ways, the amount of money involved was both too much and too little. Some have said the money was doled out with far too little oversight by the foundation. But others contend that, in the foundation’s effort to affect a number of communities, its impact was diluted.

“We spread ourselves too thin,” remarked Harold Williams, president emeritus of the J. Paul Getty Trust and a board member of the Los Angeles organization that was spawned by the Annenberg grant. “If we had taken on fewer school families and focused our dollars and human resources on those, we would have accomplished more.”

Guilbert C. Hentschke, dean of the school of education at the University of Southern California, one of the main partners in the challenge, is now studying the impact of philanthropy on education. He says that the Annenberg grant met “the classic definition of a professional reform,” meaning that it mostly paid for more of what already was going on in the schools. For the most part, he says, “The school districts and the schools gobbled up those grants like lunch, and they were ready for the next one.” What may have been needed instead, Hentschke says, was a “radical” reform that started with an empty slate and redesigned the most basic operations of the schools. Many of the leading donors today are trying to figure out how to do just that.

High Schools

The Gates Foundation has attempted some of that reimag­ining with its high-school initiative, which brought together other philanthropies, including Carnegie, the Open Society Institute, Annenberg, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, Walton, and Ford. Carnegie alone has put in $60 million for its Schools for a New Society high-school redesign effort, which aims to overhaul all the high schools in a district. “We’re not ideological about attacking the problem,” says Tom Vander Ark, who is in charge of the Gates Foundation’s education work. “We’re trying to attack it in many different ways.”

Gates Foundation officials are also aware that, unless public money takes over when private money goes away, the innovative approaches the foundation is fostering will disappear with little impact. “In the narrowest sense, it’s a $10 billion to $20 billion problem that we’re attacking, and over time we might contribute a tenth of the solutions it will require,” Vander Ark says. “It would be difficult, impractical, expensive, and ineffective for us to do this work ourselves.”

Leadership, Management, and Governance

By the end of 2004, the education foundation established by Eli Broad and his wife, Edythe, had assets worth $540 million. The foundation has already committed some $135 million to overhauling fundamental aspects of urban school districts: identifying new sources of talent for positions of authority; developing alternative training methods for managers, principals, and teachers union leaders; creating new tools for analyzing performance data; and working with school boards to help those sometimes obstructionist bodies become more focused on student learning than on petty power plays. Broad, whose fortune is variously estimated at between $4 billion and $6 billion, is in his 70s, and he too plans on giving away most of that amount during his lifetime. Most of it will go toward K–12 education causes, according to Dan Katzir, the education foundation’s managing director.

The foundation supports a number of what Katzir calls “branded flagship initiatives,” such as the Broad Center for the Management of School Systems or the Broad Institute for School Boards. Its largest investment is a $20 million-plus stake in SchoolMatters.com, a project of Standard & Poor’s School Evaluation Services unit that marries information about how schools spend their money with academic indicators.

Another major foundation that has invested heavily—even more so than Broad—in improving the skills of principals and superintendents is the Wallace Foundation, which was established by DeWitt and Lila Acheson Wallace, the founders of the Reader’s Digest Association. In 2000 the foundation committed $150 million over five years to improving leadership at the school and district level and is now underwriting in 24 states a wide variety of programs: leadership academies, university-school district partnerships, research, changes in what it takes to become certified as a principal, and superintendent training. Wallace and Broad, as well as Annenberg and Gates, also are underwriting the New York City Leadership Academy, a very expensive undertaking that pays aspiring principals full salaries as they train for a year to take jobs heading up schools in the city.

The Wallace Foundation’s Richard Laine emphasizes that it is not enough just to improve the training of principals. Put a well-trained leader in a bad system, he’s fond of saying, and “The system will win every time.” What’s needed, he says, are policy changes, giving the best teachers incentives to go into the most demanding schools and allowing principals to have more control over hiring and evaluating teachers and more flexibility and control over their budgets.

Teaching

Improving teaching has long been high on the agenda of many foundations. “It really all boils down to good teaching,” says Janice Petrovich of the Ford Foundation. “If you can figure out how to do that, you’ll make a difference.”

That, however, turns out to be difficult for foundations to do well and even more difficult to sustain. Foundations actively working on this front today have a wide variety of strategies for making a difference. Some of these might be categorized as efforts to build the capacity of the current system by simply paying for professional development sessions on particular topics; others might be thought of as attempts to change the system by developing new approaches to hiring, compensating, and evaluating teachers. Ultimately, Petrovich says, increasing the capacity of the system changes the system. But foundations often are reluctant to work inside classrooms to help teachers, for fear that they won’t have a systemic impact; at the same time, to make a difference broadly, foundations have to fund projects over which they have little control.

One of the most ambitious efforts to improve teaching is called Teachers for a New Era, a $65 million project underwritten by four venerable foundations: Carnegie, which initiated the effort and has the largest stake; Annenberg; Ford; and the Rockefeller Foundation. As of 2003, 11 education schools had received five-year grants to develop teacher-preparation programs that mimic the kind of clinical training that doctors receive as residents and that pay more explicit attention to the effect of the training on student learning. The grants must be matched locally.

The Milken Family Foundation has spent well over $100 million to make teaching more attractive by recognizing achievement and pushing districts to base pay on performance. The foundation’s Teacher Advancement Program, which provides training opportunities to help teachers climb a career ladder toward higher salaries based on their performance, is now in place in 85 schools and is poised for a major expansion, with states and the federal government offering financial support.

“We are hell-bent on figuring out a way of creating the proper incentives and putting them into practice to attract talented people into the profession,” Lowell Milken says.

Another foundation committed to improving teaching is the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, where Marshall Smith, a former acting deputy secretary of education in the Clinton administration, heads up education reforms. The former dean of the Stanford University School of Education, Smith is perhaps the leading proponent of what’s known as “systemic” reform in education. He says that about half of the $36 million or so he has to spend on K–12 education annually goes to “trying to figure out ways of improving instruction in inner-city schools.”

Academic content and performance standards are now well ingrained in American public education, Smith believes. But the standards movement that he had a hand in launching “really doesn’t touch the classroom in a deep way. What’s arisen in the past five or six years as an issue is the quality of the teacher and whether we have the capacity and smarts and knowledge to improve that.”

School Choice

During the past decade, the nation’s foundations have become major champions of school choice, supporting the development of charter schools and, to a lesser extent, the financing of vouchers to pay for private school tuition for low-income students. Indeed, it seems that many of the major foundations involved in education are backing charter schools in one way or another, either by supporting individual sites or by financing research or advocacy designed to promote policies friendly to charters.

Broad has nine separate school-choice initiatives. A significant number of the high schools Gates is supporting are charter schools. The Annenberg Foundation gave more than $10 million to underwrite an architecturally daring building for the Accelerated School, a highly successful charter school south of downtown Los Angeles. Financier Theodore J. Forstmann, along with the late John Walton (see “Tribute”) each gave $50 million to start the Children’s Scholarship Fund, which subsidizes private school tuition for low-income students. In 2001, according to the Foundation Center, the Fund was the ninth-largest recipient of charitable donations in the area of K–12 education, and in 2002 it was the top recipient. Forstmann and Walton helped raise another $70 million for scholarships from donors that included Broad, former Hollywood super agent Michael Ovitz, and supermarket mogul Ronald W. Burkle.

Since 1998 the Walton Family Foundation started by Sam and Helen Walton, the founders of Wal-Mart, has given an estimated $284 million to K–12 education, the bulk of that to support charter schools and private school scholarships for low-income students. The foundation is by far the biggest donor to school choice-related causes and has helped support, by one estimate, 10 percent of all the nation’s charter schools. “Our theory is that competition in a high enough degree will eventually create competitive pressures to encourage the existing systems to really try and compete,” says Buddy Philpott, the foundation’s executive director.

Can Philanthropy Make a Difference?

It is often difficult to tell whether a foundation is making a difference. Outside of evaluations paid for by the foundations themselves or even done internally, philanthropy often receives little scrutiny, and philanthropists are often treated like celebrities. Frederick M. Hess, an editor of this journal, analyzed press coverage of leading philanthropies involved in education for the publication Philanthropy. He concluded that journalists rarely criticize foundations on substantive issues and are far more likely to laud them than to question their strategy or their impact.

Were journalists or others to attempt it, though, it is probably easier now than in the past to determine the impact of philanthropy. That’s because, in response to the national push for academic standards and accountability, movements fueled by philanthropy, states now are required to test students and report on the results. When the Annenberg Challenge was being evaluated, for example, the use of test scores as one measure of the grant’s effectiveness met resistance in many cities where it operated. Today, it is expected that changes in test scores will be factored into the evaluations of interventions.

But some worry that demanding rapid test-score gains from foundation-backed reforms could lead to the abandonment of promising practices before they have a chance to prove themselves. That is why foundations such as Gates and Broad and others are trying to be strategic in the degree to which they rely on test scores as indicators of progress and are also monitoring a number of other changes including graduation rates, attendance, and qualitative changes.

Needless to say, there is a rich history of success and failure to learn from. In 1972 the Ford Foundation published a remarkably frank critique of its own education reform efforts during the 1960s. Called “A Foundation Goes to School” and written by Ed Meade, Ford’s longtime education program officer, the report observed that the projects the foundation supported “underestimated the complexity of improving schools” and did not fully account for the difficulty of working with unions, community leaders and parents, or the effect of broader social conditions. Foundations can’t impose their view of how the district should operate, in what Marshall Smith calls a “mega-reform.”

The challenge for foundations, then, is not to create the initiative that will work precisely as planned. The challenge is to use a variety of strategies—investment, capacity building, the creation of competition, parallel structures that challenge the status quo—to help the schools and districts themselves do a better job.

Tom Payzant, the veteran superintendent who heads up Boston Public Schools, says large school districts get funding from a variety of philanthropic organizations, but he has had to work hard to persuade these funders to align their efforts to support a system-wide vision of how to improve education and avoid contributing to what he calls “project-itis,” which is just a series of ad hoc donations that make givers feel good but have little impact on students.

“It’s been very hard for educators to stand up and say, ‘I don’t want the money unless it’s aligned with what we’re doing,’ without being snooty about it,” he says.

Lowell Milken says that one way to judge the work of foundations is whether other givers get on board and whether a project changes the way the district does business. “Is the district willing to adjust its budget and, if a project meets its goals, will they take on the whole cost? All those issues are critical to us, in looking at how we should proceed.”

Despite the sometimes gloomy assessments of philanthropy’s impact, there is reason for hope. Giving to K–12 education will surely increase. Foundations are working together much more than in the past. They seem to recognize that public policy has to change if their projects are to be sustained, and foundations are becoming more active in the policy arenas. The philanthropists are funding outside evaluations, and they seem to be more transparent and forthright about the shortcomings of what they’re funding as well as their successes. Vander Ark of the Gates Foundation openly acknowledges that 10–20 percent of the foundation’s grants are not working, and another 10–20 percent are working out differently than planned. If it were otherwise, he says, one would suspect that the foundation was only placing safe bets, and safe bets are unlikely to produce the major improvements that are needed in education.

Richard Lee Colvin is director of the Hechinger Institute on Education and the Media, based at Teachers College, Columbia University. This article is adapted from a chapter in the forthcoming book The Best of Intentions: How Philanthropy Is Reshaping the Landscape of K–12 Education.

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Making Up the Rules as You Play the Game https://www.educationnext.org/makinguptherulesasyouplaythegame/ Fri, 23 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.educationnext.org/makinguptherulesasyouplaythegame/ A Conflict of Interest at the Very Heart of NCLB

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Chicago’s school district wants the federal afterschool dollar. So do many other districts. And more than two thousand private providers, for-profit and nonprofit alike, are making their own claims.

More than $2.5 billion is at stake, a figure scheduled to increase considerably if budgetary trends continue. How should the money be distributed? Will parental choice and competition among service providers determine the outcome? Or will school districts capture the resources for themselves? Can schoolchildren be the winners this time?

These questions have grown in import as afterschool programs, the heart of the supplemental service provision of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), take on increasing significance in the implementation of the historic federal law. As more and more schools fail to make their NCLB-mandated Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) goals, the demand for supplemental education services, such as tutoring, summer school, or, most often, instruction after the end of the regular school day, is skyrocketing. Especially within big cities, where the largest concentrations of disadvantaged students reside, these afterschool programs are becoming one of the most popular features of the Bush administration’s school reforms.

The supplemental services program has major potential, but it is freighted with an inherent conflict of interest that could prove its undoing: the same school districts that are failing to make AYP are the gatekeepers for these afterschool funds. As the stakes increase, so does the funding, and so do the incentives to control those dollars.

The Legislative Compromise

To appreciate the current predicament, one need only understand that when NCLB was being hatched, afterschool was just an afterthought. The main thrust of the legislation was and remains the need to meet state proficiency standards by 2014.

But what happens when students fail to meet their AYP targets? Not much, really. For all the dire talk about the strictures NCLB places on states and localities, two of the three consequences thus far have amounted to little or nothing. Twice-failed schools (those NCLB calls “in need of improvement”) must offer parents a choice of sending their children to another public school within the district, but that option is being exercised by no more than 1 percent of eligible families. After five failing years, schools are to be “reconstituted.” Despite the dramatic verbiage, reconstitution, while it has in a few cases led to major change, usually means little more than hiring a new principal and asking teachers whether they would like to remain on the staff or move somewhere else in the district.

That leaves the third consequence, the requirement that students must be given access to supplemental services if a school fails for three years’ running. It was not supposed to be the most important result. In fact, it was born of a compromise between frustrated Capitol Hill conservatives, who saw vouchers as the accountability lever of choice, and liberals, who wanted anything but vouchers. Republicans, particularly in the House of Representatives, tossed the idea of supplemental services out as a last desperate card to avoid losing all choice options. While this seemed a backdoor way of bringing outside providers—nonprofit and for-profit, secular and religious—into the school, the legislators neglected one thing: they left the keys with the school districts. The districts could control access to students and parents and the terms of the contracts with private providers, and in many cases they could supply their own supplemental services. Even failing districts, nominally prohibited from providing such services, can divert the afterschool monies to their own use simply by suppressing parental demand for the programs, which are voluntary. Since the school districts get to keep every dollar not spent on the afterschool program and deploy those dollars for programs of their own, they have a clear financial disincentive to encourage student participation in the program.

The Growth of the Afterschool Program

Despite disincentives to school districts, parental response has been surprisingly strong. Admittedly, fewer than 100,000 students participated in afterschool programs during the 2002–03 school year, according to Department of Education records. But the following year, that number doubled to 218,031, or 11.3 percent of all eligible students. As more students become eligible for afterschool services, and as word of the program spreads throughout disadvantaged communities, federal officials expect that number to continue to soar, with big gains expected as soon as the 2004–05 tally is made.

The supply of service providers is growing to meet the demand (see Table 1). Nationwide, more than 2,000 private entities now offer supplemental services. In most cases they teach small groups of students after the end of the regular school day. The degree of competition varies from one place to the next, the most intense being within big cities that have large numbers of eligible students. Some states, such as Florida and Idaho, report no students in thrice-failed schools and so have no one eligible to receive supplemental services. Other states, like California and New York, report hundreds of thousands of eligible students. Although boutique providers limit themselves to one or two locales, the largest companies, such as Kaplan, Princeton Review, and Plato Learning, are extending their reach into a majority of the states. Their energetic moves make good economic sense. Providers are finding that they can recruit quality teachers, develop effective curricula, put into place strong management systems, and still make a reasonable profit.

Given the still pent-up demand (in Illinois, for instance, only 5 percent of eligible students are getting supplemental services), the competition for the afterschool dollar will no doubt intensify dramatically with the passage of time. Only 2 percent of the $2.5 billion available for the supplemental services program has so far been tapped. With per-student costs averaging between $700 and $2,500, depending on location and other special circumstances, the number of students served could exceed 2,000,000.

In short, if private providers build on their initial successes, if school districts are unable to stop program growth, and if Title I funding continues its steady growth (see Figure 1), the afterschool program could expand to more than ten times its 2004 size. Just as Head Start began on a limited scale but has now spread to the point where well over half of all four-year-olds are in some kind of nursery or preschool program, so the afterschool program can be expected to take on a life of its own.

Many low-income families have quite practical reasons for finding afterschool services attractive, and they can be expected to seize this new opportunity to enjoy the same outside help as middle-class families have for their afterschool needs. For one thing, they provide a safe haven for a child during hours when most parents are still at work.

The Academic Potential

The afterschool option has educational attractions as well. Traditionally, after school has been considered a time for play, sports, or extracurricular activity, as well as for latchkeys, television, PlayStation, or life on the streets. Organized afterschool programs serving the disadvantaged have tended to focus more on snacks and recreational activities (basketball, roller skating, and gymnastics) than on reading, writing, and arithmetic.

Predictably, such programs have had little impact on academic progress. Both a review of traditional afterschool programs by Swarthmore economist Rob Hollister and a recent federally funded study conducted by Mathematica found little in the way of educational benefit from traditional afterschool activities. Only 50 percent of the directors surveyed in the Mathematica study saw “enhancing students’ ability to meet specific academic goals” as one of their top three program objectives. As Hollister concluded, “There is a tremendous struggle between those who believe that afterschool programs should be focused on skill development … and those who stress the need to provide an atmosphere for growth and adult contact for children who are too often ‘home alone.’”

Presumably, by explicitly identifying afterschool programs as a way of bringing all students up to the state-determined proficiency standard, NCLB has given after school the academic focus previous programs lacked. And by introducing a measure of choice and competition into the equation, providers place themselves at risk if they do not have educationally credible programming.

At this point, we don’t know what kind of academic lift these programs can offer. On the one hand, many of the afterschool programs are limited to only one to two hours a day over a three-month period. On the other hand, education providers have strong incentives — and few impediments — to make these moments educationally rewarding. Unlike the regular school day, the afterschool program is voluntary, not compulsory. Education providers, to secure their revenue flow, must find ways to persuade students to attend. Fortunately, voluntary attendance greatly reduces the problem disruptive students pose for inner-city teachers during the regular school day, when attendance is compulsory. And the afterschool teachers themselves can be hired outside the usual union rules and grievance structures. Providers can recruit regular public-school teachers for afterschool duty if they wish, but ineffective teachers can be readily dismissed. Meanwhile, the teachers enjoy the opportunity to work with those students who are motivated enough to sign up for the program. The conditions are such that the afterschool experience should, in most cases, be educationally positive.

Nor is there any inherent reason to think students cannot learn late in the day. After all, researchers have discovered that the biological clock of young people ticks faster later in the day than at the crack of dawn. (For older adults, it is just the opposite.)

We also know that privately run afterschool programs have long been key components of effective education in other countries, especially those that score high on international math and science examinations, such as Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Those countries have a widespread system of private, academically rigorous “cram” schools to which middle-class families send their students in order to enhance their opportunities for admission to college.

In short, strong parental demand, coupled with new suppliers entering an intensely competitive market, could boost the performance of those low-income students who are seeking ways to overcome their education disadvantages. Should that happen, the afterschool initiative could turn out to be the most important NCLB reform after all.

The Chicago Factor

For all their potential, and perhaps because of their potential, afterschool programs are fast becoming an arena for acrimonious political debate. And what better place to witness the rancor than the City of Broad Shoulders and Demo­cratic dynasties: Chicago. In fact, under Mayor Richard Daley’s strong direction, the Windy City has, since the late 1990s, anticipated much of what would be included in NCLB. It has, for instance, required that 3rd graders pass an end-of-the-year exam (or boost poor scores by attending summer school) in order to advance to 4th grade.

One would expect Chicago to be among the strongest supporters of the new federal law on the question of afterschool academic programs except for one thing: despite some gains in student test scores in recent years, the Chicago school district, like many other big-city districts (see Figure 2), still has so few students making AYP that, under the federal law, the district has been designated as failing and thus cannot offer its own supplemental service programs.

The outcry from big-city school officials has been bitter. “When push comes to shove, we’re talking about children in desperate need of help,” a Chicago school administrator told an Education Week reporter last September. “Should we just cross our fingers and wait? These children need these services. They need these services yesterday.” Federal officials argued in response that if the school district can’t educate students during the regular school day, it’s time to let others have a chance after the bell rings.

Eventually the two sides reached a short-term compromise that allowed the Chicago school district to provide services itself in 2005 without suffering any serious financial penalty. But for future years, the issue remains on the table, with the feds, at least for now, continuing to insist that no failing school district be allowed to provide supplemental education services.

The federal focus on failing districts is understandable, given the way the law is currently phrased. But in terms of public policy, the central issue is not whether a district is failing but whether school districts should both offer services and control the terms of access by private providers.

The Financial Conflict of Interest

Though ignored in most of the public discussion, the financial conflict of interest is clear: school districts are given the authority to monitor afterschool education vendors even while acting as vendors themselves. If this arrangement were used in the banking industry, the Securities and Exchange Commission would also be a brokerage firm.

Admittedly, a district, if designated as failing, cannot offer the services itself. But that does not eliminate the conflict of interest. If parents are demanding afterschool services, then up to 20 percent of Title I funds given to that district must be used to fund the private providers offering the services. If parental demand for such programs is slight, then the failing school district may use the money for other purposes.

School districts have powerful weapons that can be used in the battle to limit the scope of the demand and control the provision of services. For one thing, privacy rules give districts exclusive control over communications with students and families. Although districts, by federal rule, must send a letter explaining the afterschool option to all eligible families, that letter, often sent late in the school year, is typically laden with the usual bureaucratic jargon. According to the Center on Education Policy study, “Parents thought the letters informing them about services were too long and complicated and buried key information.” As Michael Petrilli, a former federal education official has pointed out, “It takes very aggressive marketing to make low-income families aware of their options, and districts are not doing more than is required under the letter of the law.”

To be fair, not every district is proving obstreperous. On the contrary, a number of the largest, New York City included, are doing their best to inform parents of the options available to them. Even where cooperation is less clear-cut, it can in many instances be attributed to significant start-up problems. Schools are not identified as failing until the summer or well into the new school year in which afterschool services are to be made available. Districts must then organize their own afterschool programs or sign contracts with providers, then inform parents of services being offered.

But with a modicum of adjustments, those practical problems can be addressed, if districts are inclined to do so. Unfortunately, financial incentives and ingrained opposition to choice and competition push in the opposite direction. When asked for ways of improving NCLB, one administrator said, “Eliminate the Supplemental Services provision; it is very expensive and is of minimal value.” Union leaders are no less antagonistic. In New York, for example, the spokesman for the New York State United Teachers, the state’s largest teachers union, commented, “Our concern is that it is going to be difficult if not impossible to track whether or not this money is being spent effectively.” Although the point is well taken, teacher unions seldom show a similar kind of skepticism for most other kinds of school expenditure.

The animosity to the afterschool programs and other supplemental services was amply revealed in the Center on Education Policy survey of school administrators, who, when given anonymity, frankly stated their deep-seated suspicion of the profit motive:

“Supplemental Service funds should go to districts that would provide services without the profit motive.”

“I would not use federal funds to support a program being operated by individuals not held to the same standards that public school employees are held to.”

“Supplemental Services for any qualified provider will cause a cottage industry to develop that will be driven by profit and not academics.”

Suspicious of the private providers, mindful of the cost to their own coffers, and in control of the access channel, districts thus have both incentives and opportunities to check program growth. In Worcester, Massachusetts, for example, the school district, which offers its own afterschool programming, actively discourages other entities from offering their wares. Says one for-profit provider, “The school district is the owner of the relationship between provider and the parent. And I can’t get in.” In such cases, says Harvard professor William Howell, “It’s like asking a BMW dealer to extol the benefits of buying a Volvo.”

Such resistance to outside vendors is not limited to the districts in Senator Ted Kennedy’s home state. In testimony before a congressional subcommittee last May, Jeffrey Cohen, president of Catapult Learning, reported the numerous obstacles providers are facing nationally:

“We have seen parent notification letters that are impossible to decipher. We have seen multipart registration processes that seem to delay registration, rather than encouraging it. And, we have been prohibited from talking to school principals and parents.”

Districts are asked to hold “fairs” where competing providers can tell parents about their offerings, said Cohen, but, according to a high official at one of the major providers, “Districts do nothing beyond the bare minimum to promote the fairs to parents.”

When districts have financial incentives to limit participation, such obstacles make bureaucratic sense, however much they limit opportunities for families. Admittedly, private providers need to be monitored, so as to avoid “suede-shoe operators” from peddling their wares to unwary parents, a concern of Demo­cratic representative George Miller, who serves as the ranking minority member of the House Education Committee. Some have been found to be paying parents to attend, and others have used a web site managed from overseas to work with students. As the program ramps up, all private providers need to demonstrate that their services are beneficial. But to turn the job of managing providers over to school districts that have an incentive to limit the competition defies all regulatory logic.

Of course, it cannot be left to the industry to monitor itself. But as long as districts have the monitoring authority, they can be expected to look for legal constraints that will keep the programs in-house. “There are some districts that are clearly not playing fair and have been a thorn in the side of the providers,” says Petrilli.

Despite tighter federal guidelines issued in June 2005, local districts still have a great deal of latitude when negotiating contracts with providers. As Michael Casserly, head of the Council of the Great City Schools, reports, “School districts and potential providers have found themselves tussling over the length of the contracts, per pupil fees, billing and payment procedures, staff qualifications, union rules, and the like.”

In short, the possibilities for burdensome regulations can be endless whenever the financial incentives to create obstacles are ingrained. As an administrator in Worcester explained, “We’re not required to provide transportation. And, to be honest, to send money out of the district, I’m not sure that we would even offer to do that.”

But Will Children Benefit?

How this power struggle will evolve, and whether students will benefit, remains the big unknown. Unfortunately, the accountability provisions of NCLB do not contain any mechanism for ensuring that students profit from afterschool programs, mainly because states are focusing more on overall school performance than on the performance of individual students.

If the NCLB accountability system can be gradually shifted to a student focus, then the impact of afterschool programs, along with much else, can become part of the planning for the future. Until then, one can expect private providers to claim great success without much convincing evidence. And school districts will complain about problems, corruption, and profit making with no more than an anecdote here and there to justify their self-serving complaints. But for those who think that choice and competition are the key to school reform, the afterschool intervention is the most promising vehicle currently available.

Paul E. Peterson is professor of government, Harvard University, and the editor-in-chief of Education Next.

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The Truths about Charter Schools https://www.educationnext.org/the-truths-about-charter-schools/ Fri, 23 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.educationnext.org/the-truths-about-charter-schools/ New Research from Chicago and North Carolina

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With charter schools now serving approximately one million students nationwide, policymakers have been awaiting rigorous evaluations of their effects on student learning. The following articles help fill the gap.Caroline Hoxby and Jonah Rockoff present evidence from the first randomized evaluation of charter schools, focusing on three charter schools in Chicago. Robert Bifulco and Helen Laddexamine charter schools in the Tar Heel state, concentrating on those students whose progress can be compared in both charter and traditional public schools.

The picture that emerges is, to say the least, complex. But we learn some significant things: Charter schools appear to do better with young students who matriculate directly into these schools than with students who enter during the middle-school years. Students who remain in charter schools do better than those who migrate back and forth between sectors.

Findings from the City of Big Shoulders by Hoxby & Rockoff, page 52

Results from the Tar Heel State by Bifulco & Ladd, page 60

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Results from the Tar Heel State https://www.educationnext.org/resultsfromthetarheelstate/ Fri, 23 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.educationnext.org/resultsfromthetarheelstate/ Older Students Did Better When in Regular Public Schools

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In this paper, we use an extensive student-level data set to evaluate the impact of charter schools in North Carolina on the math and reading performance of students in grades 4 through 8. We address three main questions: Do students attending charter schools in these grades make larger or smaller gains in achievement than they would have made in traditional public schools? If so, what accounts for the quality differences between charter schools and traditional public schools? And, finally, do students who attend traditional public schools subject to competition from charter schools make larger achievement gains than they would have in the absence of charter schools?

 

Controlled Choice

Legislation authorizing charter schools in North Carolina was passed in 1996, and the first charter schools opened in the fall of 1997. By capping the number of charter schools statewide, limiting the annual growth in the number of schools per district, and providing for input from the local district before approval of charter applications, North Carolina has exercised more control over the establishment of charter schools than some states. Nevertheless, the North Carolina legislation is quite permissive in that it allows any individual or group to apply for a charter and does not require local district approval of a charter application. North Carolina charters operate as independent nonprofit corporations, act as their own employers, are automatically exempted from several regulations, receive operating funding at the same level as traditional public schools, and are subject to the same state testing requirements as traditional public schools. Thus North Carolina’s program includes many of the elements recommended by charter school advocates. However, the state does not provide charter schools any additional funding for facilities.

The number of charter schools in North Carolina grew steadily after 1997. By 2001–02 there were 93 charter schools and more than 18,000 charter school students; charter schools made up 4 percent of all schools and enrolled 1.4 percent of the state’s 1.3 million students. Charters can be revoked for a number of reasons, including poor student performance and financial mismanagement. Overall, about 12 percent of the charter schools that have been opened are now closed, but in no case was the decision to revoke a charter or to close due primarily to low student performance. Growth in the number of charter schools has slowed markedly since 2001–02, primarily because the state law caps the number of charter schools at one hundred. Even so, only seven states had more charter schools than North Carolina as of 2002 and of those, only five had a greater concentration of charter schools: Arizona, Florida, Wisconsin, Michigan, and California. The 93 charter schools operating in 2001–02 were spread across 46 of North Carolina’s 100 counties.

Our analysis of these schools is based on data from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center, a collaborative effort involving the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, Duke University, and the University of North Carolina. The database contains individual-level information on test scores and background characteristics for all students in grades 3 through 8 in the state’s public schools, charter and traditional. We use these data to measure the gains in student achievement made by individual students each year between 4th and 8th grade.

The mixture of 3rd through 8th graders in North Carolina charter schools in 2001–02 differed from that in traditional public schools (see Figure 1). Compared with traditional public schools, charter schools in North Carolina enrolled a larger percentage of black students and lower percentages of Hispanic and white students. Roughly 40 percent of charter school students in grades 3–8 were black, compared with 31 percent in traditional public schools. At the same time, charter schools served a higher percentage of students whose parents are college educated and a lower percentage of students whose parents are high school dropouts.

SOURCE: Authors’ presentation of data from North Carolina Education Research Data Center

Despite the higher average education level of their parents, charter school students exhibit lower levels of performance on end-of-grade tests in both reading and math. The gap between students in charter schools and students in traditional public schools is .12 standard deviations in reading and .22 standard deviations in math. Our analysis attempts to determine if any of this difference in performance can be attributed to the charter schools themselves.

 

Measuring Charter School Effectiveness

The primary challenge in determining how effective charter schools are in raising student achievement arises from the fact that charter school students are self-selected. Because they have chosen to attend a charter school, they are likely to differ in unobserved ways from otherwise similar students who choose to remain in traditional public schools.

In principle, the best way to determine how effectively charter schools raise student achievement is to conduct a randomized experiment. Studies adopting this approach take the students interested in attending a charter school, use a lottery to assign them randomly either to the charter school or to a control group of students who would not have access to that school, and then compare the achievement of the students given access to the charter school with that of the students in the control group. This approach, which is used by Caroline Hoxby and Jonah Rockoff in their study of charter schools in Chicago (see “Findings from the City of Big Shoulders”), is useful for determining if a particular charter school or the education program it offered is effective. However, the results of such experimental studies apply only to the programs offered by and the type of students who apply to the specific oversubscribed charter schools evaluated.

When studying an entire system of charter schools, including some that are not oversubscribed, it is not possible to conduct a true experiment. Thus we use a method that in effect compares the test-score gains of individual students in charter schools with the test-score gains made by the same students when they were in traditional public schools. This approach provides powerful protection against bias from self-selection. However, this protection comes at a cost. In the end, our analysis of charter school effectiveness is based on the experiences of only those students for whom we observe annual gains (whether positive or negative) in test scores at least once in a charter school and at least once in a traditional public school. Because we have information on students only in grades 3 through 8, they must have attended a traditional public school at least once between 4th and 8th grade to be included in our analysis. If such students are not representative of all students who attend charter schools, our analysis may not provide an accurate measure of the average effect of attending a charter school in these grades. As we show below, however, this limitation does not affect our basic conclusions.

 

The Effect of Attending a Charter School in North Carolina

Our data set includes information on five cohorts of students: those in 3rd grade in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, some 495,000 students altogether. Each cohort contains all the students in 3rd grade in North Carolina public schools, including charter schools, during the specified year. Each student has a unique identifier that is consistent over time, which allows us to follow students from 3rd grade through the last year that they remain in North Carolina public schools, the year they complete 8th grade, or the 2001–02 school year, whichever comes first. To compare test-score gains of students from different grades, we first standardize their raw scores separately by grade and year to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one and measure the change in each student’s standardized score from one year to the next. A gain score of zero indicates that a student has kept pace with the average student in the state, while a student with a gain score of 0.25 standard deviations will have improved his or her performance by enough to exceed roughly 10 percent of the state’s students.

We first compare the average gains made by all students in charter schools with the gains made by students in traditional public schools, taking into account differences in gender, ethnicity, and the highest level of education completed by their parents. Because moving between schools is known to have a negative impact on student achievement, we also control for whether the student changed schools in the current year and whether that change was structural (for instance, the student moved to a junior high school from its feeder elementary school).

The results of this initial analysis reveal that students in charter schools, on average, make annual gains that are 0.06 standard deviations less in reading and 0.08 standard deviations less in math than students in traditional public schools with similar observable characteristics. Because the students in charter schools are self-selected, however, this difference could be attributable to one or more unmeasured characteristics of the students rather than to the fact that they are in a charter school.

As explained above, we address the problem of self-selection by comparing the gains made by students the years they were in charter schools with the gains made by the same students the years they were in traditional public schools. Of the 8,745 students in our data set who attended a charter school for at least one year, 5,746 also attended a traditional public school at least once between 4th and 8th grade. The results of our analysis of these “switchers,” which continues to take into account the difficulties associated with moving between schools, again indicate that students make smaller gains while enrolled in charter schools, by nearly 0.10 standard deviations in reading and 0.16 standard deviations in math. This pattern provides strong evidence that the smaller gains made by these charter school students are indeed due to the quality of the schools they attend rather than to any unobserved differences between charter school students and students in traditional public schools.

The difference in the rate of achievement growth between students enrolled in charter schools and students in traditional public schools is substantial. It is substantially larger than differences between the growth rates for children of high-school dropouts and the children of parents with graduate degrees as well as those between blacks and whites, differences that are the focus of considerable concern. For example, our analysis indicates that the annual gains made by children of high-school dropouts lag behind those of children of parents with graduate degrees by 0.03 standard deviations in reading and 0.06 standard deviations in math. The negative effects of attending a charter school, on average, for the students in grades 4 through 8 included in our analysis, are roughly three times this large.

 

How Representative Are the NC Charter Students?

Analyses of the effects of attending a charter school may be misleading if the students included are not representative of all students who actually attend charter schools. It is therefore important to consider how the 5,746 “switchers” included in our final analysis, those who attended both a charter school and a traditional public school in North Carolina between grades 4 and 8, differ from the state’s full population of 8,745 charter school students in these grades. Although our data confirm that the two groups are quite similar demographically, two differences are worth noting.

The first is that students who leave charter schools before 8th grade to return to public schools are overrepresented  in our analysis. Thirty-seven percent of the students for whom we observe test-score gains at least once in both sectors attended a traditional public school after they were in a charter school, while the same is true of only 30 percent of all students in charter schools. That is, charter school “exiters” are overrepresented in our analysis by nearly 25 percent. If these exiters left charter schools because they were not doing well there academically, our estimate of the effect of attending a charter school may be more negative than the true effect for all charter school students.

Looking separately at the effect of attending a charter school for exiters reveals that the effect of attending a charter school is, in fact, considerably more negative than for students who were observed first in a traditional public school and remained in a charter school throughout the study period (see Figure 2). We therefore calculated weighted averages of the effects for students observed only entering charter schools and the effects for students observed exiting charters, with the weights equal to the proportion of each group in the total population of charter school students. The corrected estimates are -0.09 standard deviations in reading and –0.15 standard deviations in math. In short, the overrepresentation of exiters matters, but it accounts for only a small fraction of the estimated negative effect of charter schools.

* Significant at the 0.05 level.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center

A second key difference between switchers and the larger group of students attending charter schools in any year is that students who entered charter schools in the younger grades are underrepresented. Although our data do not allow us to address this issue directly while still accounting for the self-selection of students into charter schools, simple comparisons indicate that students who entered charter schools in the later grades made smaller gains in math (but not reading) than students who entered earlier. Given the underrepresentation of students who enter during early grades, this difference suggests that the average effects of attending a charter school across all grades, 4 through 8, may be less negative than indicated by our final analysis, at least for math. Even so, we see no reason to suspect that the true average effects are not negative.

New Schools with New Students

One potential explanation for these findings is that many of North Carolina’s charter schools were in their first years of operation and thus were grappling with the challenges of starting a new school. We therefore reran our analysis, allowing for the effect of attending a charter school to vary with the number of years the charter school had been open. The results confirm that the negative effects of attending a charter school are considerably greater for students in newly opened charter schools than for students in charter schools that are more established. After again correcting for the overrepresentation of exiters, the effects of attending a newly opened charter school were -0.17 standard deviations in reading and -0.28 standard deviations in math, or almost twice the average effect reported above for all charter schools in the state. However, it is important to note that the complications associated with being a new school cannot fully explain the poor average performance of charter schools: the negative effects of attending a charter school in North Carolina remain greater than .10 standard deviations in both subjects, even for schools that have been operating for five years (see Figure 3a and 3b).

* Significant at the 0.05 level.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center

* Significant at the 0.05 level.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center

We next considered whether the effects of attending a charter school also varied with the length of time the specific student had been enrolled. The results proved informative. First, the negative average effects of attending a charter school are driven largely, but not entirely, by students making unusually small gains during their first year in a charter. This is true regardless of how long the school has been operating. For some reason, transferring into a charter school seems to have a much more negative effect on achievement than transferring into a traditional public school. Second, students who choose to remain in charter schools do not continue to make smaller gains than students in traditional public schools after their initial year in a charter school. This is reassuring, in that it justifies the decision of many parents to keep their children in charter schools once they are there; the disruptive effects of moving between schools would make the return to a traditional public school counterproductive. However, it is also clear that the initial achievement hit these students take is not offset by gains in subsequent years, so that even this group, which is harmed least by attending a charter school, still has lower levels of achievement as a result of attending a charter school. Finally, we see that students who ultimately leave charter schools two or more years after they enter continue to make smaller gains relative to those they would have made in a traditional public school even after their first year in a charter school.

One reason North Carolina’s charter schools might have difficulty providing effective education programs is high rates of student turnover. Rapidly changing student populations make student grouping and scheduling more challenging, intake of new students can distract administrators from other tasks, and assessing and helping new students can place extra demands on teachers’ time. On average, the percentage of students in a school in grades 4 through 8 that made a nonstructural transfer in the previous year is far higher in charter schools than in traditional public schools. While only 14 percent of students in traditional public schools made nonstructural transfers, the same is true of more than one-quarter of students in fifth-year charter schools and of an even larger share of students in newer charter schools. Taking into account the higher rates of student turnover in charter schools reduces the magnitude of the estimated negative effect of charter schools by 29 percent in reading and by 30 percent in math. Thus high rates of student turnover may account for as much as one-third of the negative impact charter schools have on student performance. Even so, the coefficients on the charter school variable remain statistically significant, suggesting that other factors also play a role in the poor performance of charter schools.

 

Effects of Competition on Traditional Public Schools

Charter schools have the potential to have broader effects on student achievement if traditional public schools respond to the threat of losing students to charter schools by improving the quality of their own education programs. Although the number of charter schools in North Carolina and the nation has grown rapidly over the past decade, they still represent only a fraction of the total number of public schools and are likely to remain so for a number of years. Still, if North Carolina’s traditional public schools improved in response to their presence, the apparently negative effects of charter schools on the achievement of students who attend them could be offset by more positive statewide effects.

To estimate the effects of charter schools on students in traditional public schools, we use information on each school’s distance from the nearest charter school to develop indicators of whether or not the traditional school faces competition from charter schools. How close does a charter school have to be located to a traditional public school to provide meaningful competition? For 90 percent of the 6,576 transfers in our database, the distance between the charter school where the student enrolled and the traditional public school the student attended the previous year is less than ten miles. Our data also indicate that schools within 2.5 miles of a charter school lose a higher percentage of students to charter schools, and hence appear to face more competition, on average, than do schools 2.5 to 5 miles from the nearest charter, and that the threat of losing students to a charter school depends also on the number of charter schools within a given radius of the school. Our analysis of competitive effects therefore investigates whether the effect of charter schools on traditional public schools varies with the number of nearby charter schools as well as with the distance to the nearest charter.

First, however, we must take into account the fact that the location of charter schools is not randomly determined. If charter schools were primarily established in response to dissatisfaction with traditional public schools, they would tend to be located in areas with low-quality traditional public schools where students would tend to make below-average test-score gains. Alternatively, charter schools might be more likely to attract students in areas where parents tend to be more motivated and more informed. In those areas, gains in student test scores might be higher than in other areas, even in the absence of charter schools.

To address the problem of nonrandom location, we essentially measure the effect of charter school competition on test-score gains by comparing the gains made by students in each traditional public school before the establishment of a nearby charter with the gains those same students made in that school after the arrival of nearby charter schools. Our results suggest that traditional public schools did not respond to competition from charter schools by becoming more effective, at least as measured by the learning gains made by individual students in the years immediately following establishment of charter schools. Not only are none of the estimated effects statistically different from zero, but many point in the opposite of the expected direction. We emphasize, however, that the intensity of competition in North Carolina is not very great. Even schools located close to several charter schools are unlikely to lose a substantial percentage of students. Thus our finding should not be interpreted as a general statement about the potential of charter school competition to influence traditional public schools.

Conclusions

We set out in this research to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of charter schools on the math and reading performance of North Carolina students in grades 4 through 8. Our results can only be described as discouraging for charter school supporters. Students in these grades make considerably smaller achievement gains in charter schools than they would have in traditional public schools, and the negative effects are not limited to schools in their first year of operation. Nor are the negative effects of attending a charter school substantially offset by positive effects of charter schools on traditional public schools, a finding that may reflect the fact that North Carolina charter schools provide only a limited amount of competition.

However, for students who choose to remain in charter schools, the negative effects of attending a charter school are largely limited to their first year of attending a charter school. It is also important to note that our findings apply only to students who either entered a charter school after grade 4 or exited a charter school before grade 8. Our data do not allow us to comment on the experience of students who entered charter schools before grade 4 and attended them through the end of middle school.

We also provide evidence that high student turnover rates may account for about 30 percent of the difference between test-score gains made in charter schools and what we would expect the same students to make in traditional public schools. This finding suggests that student turnover can be an unintended negative side effect of school choice. Because school-choice plans lower the costs to families of switching schools, it is plausible that such plans will increase the movement of students across schools and thereby increase student turnover rates, to the detriment of all students.

However, charter schools in North Carolina exhibit negative effects on student achievement even after controlling for student turnover rates. Further investigation to determine whether the remaining negative effects are due to peer influence, resource inadequacies, or poor management would be useful. Whatever the reason for the low performance, the public interest is not well served when charter schools are ineffective in raising student achievement.

 

-Robert Bifulco is assistant professor of public policy, University of Connecticut. Helen F. Ladd is professor of public policy studies and economics, Duke University.

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Pseudo-Science and a Sound Basic Education https://www.educationnext.org/pseudoscienceandasoundbasiceducation/ Fri, 23 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.educationnext.org/pseudoscienceandasoundbasiceducation/ Checked: “The New York Adequacy Study: Determining the Cost of Providing All Children in New York an Adequate Education,” American Institutes for Research and Management Analysis and Planning (March 2004). “Resource Adequacy Study for the New York State Commission on Education Reform,” Standard & Poor’s School Evaluation Service (March 2004). “Report and Recommendations of the ... Read more

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Checked:

The New York Adequacy Study: Determining the Cost of Providing All Children in New York an Adequate Education,” American Institutes for Research and Management Analysis and Planning (March 2004).

Resource Adequacy Study for the New York State Commission on Education Reform,” Standard & Poor’s School Evaluation Service (March 2004).

Report and Recommendations of the Judicial Referees,” in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs, against The State ofNew York, et al., Defendants (November 2004).

Most people who read the headlines last February were stunned to learn that New York City schools were being shortchanged by $5.6 billion per year, or more than $5,000 per student. The 43 percent court-ordered budget increase, from around $13 billion in operating expenditures to something approaching $19 billion (not including some $9 billion over five years for building improvements), is the largest school finance “adequacy” judgment ever awarded.

Of course, most people do not have a good grasp on either the economics or the performance of New York City schools. If they did, they would be even more stunned by the declared shortfall.

Figure 1 shows the recent history of spending in New York City, now nearly $13,000 per student per year, which is than 50 percent above the national average and pulling away.

SOURCE: New York State Education Department; National Center for Education Statistics

The city does, by any standard, face huge education problems. Indeed, despite a drastic restructuring of the school bureaucracy, implemented by Mayor Michael Bloomberg beginning in 2002 (see Forum), and despite the heavy infusions of cash shown described in Figure 1, Gotham’s academic outcomes remain poor. On the 2003 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) tests, 46 percent of the city’s students scored “below basic” in mathematics, and 38 percent were below that low threshold in reading (compared with 33 and 28 percent for the nation, respectively). On the state exams that can be tracked over time, New York City has had mixed results—improvement in some areas but declines elsewhere.

But the discrepancy between years of budget increases and years of mediocre academic outcomes did not deter New York State Supreme Court Judge Leland DeGrasse from deciding that the problem could be solved by an annual addition of $5.6 billion.

The very process of budget determination implicit in such judicial appropriations gives the first indication that something is fundamentally haywire. Ordinarily, courts have nothing to do with expenditures. That is a matter for the political branches, not the courts, to decide—a constitutional arrangement that led that great New Yorker, Alexander Hamilton, to declare the judiciary the weakest branch. In New York, as in all other states, the normal appropriations process begins with the governor’s creating the budget recommendations for education and other state services. The legislature, subject to gubernatorial veto, appropriates the funds. But such constitutional proprieties were set aside when Judge DeGrasse—with no previous education expertise and no relevant staff support and without considering the impact on other areas of expenditure—intervened to establish the level of education appropriations for New York City. Suddenly the weakest branch had declared itself the boss.

Given the fundamental constitutional conflict involved, this judicial decision will probably be in and out of the courts and legislature for some time. To get some hint of the future, one may look no farther than neighboring New Jersey, where the courts have retained control over the financing of several city school districts for decades.

Nonetheless, it is informative to investigate what is behind the DeGrasse appropriations, because New York is only the leading edge of a national movement. In more than two-thirds of the states, teacher unions, school districts, and other interested parties have filed similar lawsuits that seek judgments resembling the stunning result handed down in New York.

The DeGrasse judgment is the result of a decade-long political and legal struggle (described by New York Daily Newsreporter Joe Williams in this journal earlier this year: “The Legal Cash Machine,” Education Next, Summer 2005). Several groups, led by the Campaign for Fiscal Equity (CFE), a nonprofit legal advocacy organization, filed suit in 1993 claiming that New York State was depriving New York City public school students of their constitutional rights to a “sound basic education,” a standard that had been prescribed in 1982 by the state’s highest court (in New York, the Court of Appeals). Despite its name, the lead plaintiff in the 1993 complaint, CFE, did not argue that the state’s financing arrangements were inequitable, but that the funds given to New York City were not “adequate” for a sound basic education. From his Manhattan courtroom, Judge DeGrasse sided with the plaintiffs. The decision was ultimately upheld by the Court of Appeals, which remanded the case to DeGrasse to ensure that the Constitution was served; hence his appropriations figure.

But the interesting question, ignored in all the righteous hoopla over the court decision, is: Where did Judge DeGrasse get that $5.6 billion figure? Why not $10 billion? Or just $1 billion? How much does a sound basic education cost?

 

The Inexact Science of Costing Out

The paternity of the $5.6 billion figure is easily traced to the plaintiffs in the case, whose expertise was treated as authoritative, despite their obvious vested interest in the outcome. The Campaign for Fiscal Equity had commissioned a costing-out study by a consortium of two consulting firms, the American Institutes for Research (AIR) and Management Analysis and Planning, Inc. (MAP). Both firms claimed to have the analytical capacity to determine objectively the funding schools need to perform adequately. The consortium, known as AIR/MAP, made the extraordinary claim in its November 2002 proposal that its study would answer the question, “What does it actually cost to provide the resources that each school needs to allow its students to meet the achievement levels specified in the Regents Learning Standards?”

The following year AIR/MAP submitted its final costing-out analysis to its client, the plaintiff, who then submitted the document to the court by way of the panel of three referees appointed by Judge DeGrasse to assist in fashioning an appropriate remedy. These referees were a Fordham Law School dean and two retired New York judges, none with any particular expertise in school finance. After an intensive and expensive period (the three referees submitted combined bills in excess of $350,000 for their part-time work over the course of four months), they issued a 57-page report accepting the essential elements of the AIR/MAP document that CFE had submitted to the court. The referees recommended that funding of New York City schools be ramped up an additional $5.6 billion a year within four years; that new studies be undertaken every four years to find out how much, if any, additional funding would be required; that $9.2 billion be spent for capital projects spread over the following five years; and that another study be conducted after five years to see if additional spending was required.

Both Judge DeGrasse and the mainstream New York City media covering the story treated the referees’ report as authoritative. Little attention was given to the other studies reviewed by the referees that recommended quite different levels of expenditure. One might have thought the referees would give at least equal consideration to the report submitted by the New York State Commission on Education Reform appointed by Governor George Pataki. Known as the Zarb Commission, after its chairman, Frank G. Zarb, a former chairman of NASDAQ, the commission estimated that the city needed $1.9 billion to provide an adequate education. Meanwhile, the City of New York, eager to get as much state money as possible, proposed additional spending of $5.4 billion, an amount that resembled the AIR/MAP recommendation. It added the caveat that none of this funding should come from the city. Not to be left out, the New York State Board of Regents calculated its own figure, $3.8 billion. Even Standard & Poor’s jumped in, with an independent study that included 16 different estimates for the resource gap, ranging from as high as $7.3 billion to as low as $1.9 billion, depending on achievement targets, regional cost adjustments, and cost effectiveness of districts. The Zarb Commission, in fact, used the lowest of S&P’s estimates as the basis for its own recommendation.

This range of estimates underscores the arbitrary nature of any number the court would order the legislature to spend. Even the plaintiff’s own consultant, AIR/MAP, admitted that its “‘costing out’ methods are not based on an exact science.” Far from being an exact science, the method they chose, as we shall see, was profoundly subjective, a matter of judgment by and for self-interested parties.

 

Aligning Professional Judgment and Self-Interest

The AIR/MAP study relied on the “professional judgment” method in its costing-out analysis. The consultants brought together multiple panels of school personnel and asked them to design a program that would ensure that all New York City students could get a sound basic education and determine the resources needed to deliver the program. But these program designers, 56 in all, were also service providers whose pay, working conditions, and other funds were directly dependent on the resources put into the system. Such a procedure is akin to asking Martha Stewart how much you should pay for her to decorate her own house. When someone else is to pay, and Martha is to enjoy, one can only expect the sky to be the limit.

Admittedly, not all 56 panelists worked within the New York City school system. But all except one, a retired employee, were currently working somewhere within the New York State school system. Since the panelists were asked to cost out programs statewide (presumably in anticipation that any financing changes would spill over to districts outside New York City), the conflict of interest could hardly be more direct, unless the panelists had been paid for their labors in proportion to the amount they recommended.

These arguments are not against professional judgment per se, but against its misuse in this case. There is a big difference between asking professional educators to make education decisions and resource allocations within the constraints of a fixed budget and asking them to determine what that budget should be. The former endeavor is what they traditionally do, exactly where the professional judgment of an administrator might be helpful, just as it would be useful to have Martha Stewart’s decorating opinion. But that opinion is solicited after a fixed budget has been set. Asking the professional educators to determine the budget only guarantees solutions that retain the basic organization of the current system, including the existing incentive structure. After all, it is a structure that the participants have accepted and to which they have grown accustomed.

Notably, the AIR/MAP approach did not consider any ways of reconfiguring the education system so as to make it more efficient. Instead, it assumed that existing arrangements were fixed and made their best guess as to how much more money that system might need to get the job done. Not surprisingly, the professionals’ recommendations included such nostrums as paying employees (themselves) more and giving them less work to do (reducing class size). The notion that the city’s current stable of teachers should be paid more is particularly ironic, given that much of the plaintiffs’ evidence at trial was devoted to documenting their shortcomings. Moreover, research has shown that any of these steps would cost a fortune, far beyond any reasonable expectations of achieving adequate performance levels. The professional judgment panels paid such research no attention whatsoever.

 

Substituting Self-Interested Judgment for Data

The AIR/MAP analytic approach ignores ample evidence from New York indicating the absence of a clear connection between performance and expenditure. Take, for example, the percentage of students in a district who obtain a Regents’ diploma, a key measure of education quality in New York. Districts that are higher performing by this indicator actually spend, on average, no more than the lower performing districts (after adjustment for differences in family income, special-education placements, and the percentage of students who are of limited English proficiency). Thus the normal operations of districts in the state give no indication that increasing expenditure alone would necessarily enhance student achievement.

Now consider New York City itself. The judicial referees call for a 43 percent increase in spending. Between 1998 and 2003, as Figure 1 shows, expenditures in New York City increased by almost exactly that amount, 44 percent, an increase that surpassed the rate of increase for the state as a whole and for the nation. If money is the answer, this history should help foretell the results of the next infusion. But as Figures 2a through 3b demonstrate, student passing rates in reading and math for New York City students have remained barely above 50 percent—in fact, have worsened in 8th-grade reading. Whatever small gains have occurred, they hardly support the conclusion that spending increases constitute the solution to the city’s inadequate schools. Perhaps these numbers led AIR/MAP to qualify their findings so dramatically as to undermine the validity of their study:

The success of schools also depends on other individuals and institutions to provide the health, intellectual stimulus, and family support on which public school systems can build. Schools cannot and do not perform their role in a vacuum. Furthermore, schools’ success depends on effective allocation of resources and implementation of programs in school districts.

If more resources are not sufficient, what is the evidence that they are necessary? Are there reasons to believe that the next 40-plus-percent spending increase will have a greater impact than the last? Or should we expect the next quadrennial costing-out study to call for yet another 40-plus-percent increase in spending to meet the achievement goals?

SOURCE: New York State Education Department

SOURCE: New York State Education Department

S&P’s Successful Schools Model

The Standard & Poor’s study relied on  the “successful schools” method, focusing on observed costs for a set of New York districts that obtain good student outcomes. Even after allowing for the cost of educating students with special needs, S&P’s analysis showed a wide dispersion across school districts in the spending observed to achieve equivalent outcomes. The lower-spending half of successful districts spent 50 percent less than the higher-spending districts, proving that many good schools do quite well with much less than other schools. Recognizing this, the Zarb Commission went with the average expenditures of the lower-spending half of the successful districts.

The definition of success is particularly relevant to understanding the synthesis of the different approaches, since, as noted, the full S&P analysis considered a variety of possible definitions of “successful schools.” The Zarb Commission relied on the set of school districts meeting the Regents’ operational definition of an adequate education: 80 percent of their 4th graders passed the math and English exams and passed five of the high-school graduation tests. This definition of the objective of an adequate education was consistent with the court’s decision on how to interpret the requirement of a sound basic education.

Curiously, however, AIR/MAP defined a sound basic education quite differently. It determined that a successful school district was one in which all students meet the full Regents Learning Standards, a much higher bar that moved the 80 percent pass rate to 100 percent. That measure was explicitly rejected in the New York Court of Appeals decision, which the referees were being asked to implement.

Meeting more stringent standards should clearly cost more than meeting the lesser standards. Yet the referees, by carefully selecting and modifying components of the S&P study, were pleased that they could extract similar estimates of adequate funding requirements from the various studies. They state, “This relative convergence of costing-out results derived from three different methods—the successful school district method used in the State’s costing-out analysis, the professional judgment method used in plaintiffs’ costing-out analysis, and the City’s detailed planning method—provides comfort that our $5.63 billion costing-out recommendation to the Court is indeed sound.”

If the costing-out studies have any validity, the cost of achieving very different outcomes should not be the same.

 

Why Worry about Efficiency?

The most basic problem is the absence of a scientific method in the application of the costing-out models. The reasonable scientific question is, “What level of funding would be required to achieve a given level of student performance?” In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that the methodology used in any of the existing costing-out approaches, including the two considered here, is capable of answering that question.

The existing analyses never consider the minimum cost, or efficient level of spending, needed to achieve the desired outcome. Instead, they are fixated on identifying any policies that might lead to an improvement in performance, almost without regard to the magnitude of gains or cost. The focus on minimal required spending is a necessary ingredient, because without this restriction the question of cost is completely arbitrary (and thus beyond science). Actual spending to achieve an outcome can obviously range anywhere from the efficient level to infinity. But none of the available methodologies focuses on the efficient spending required for any given performance level.

Moreover, locking in the current technology (through professional judgment or successful schools) can at best produce marginal changes in outcomes. Overcoming the deficits illustrated in Figures 2a through 3b will require more dramatic improvements.

Consider again the AIR/MAP analysis. There is, first, no demonstration that the schools that employ the panel members are using their funds in a particularly effective manner or that their experiences indicate they have the data to answer the “level of funding” question. Second, there is no way to replicate the wish lists of the specific panels, because they are based solely on personal opinions of the selected panelists and not on any data about school operations.

More important, the specific approach of AIR/MAP for combining the judgments of the separate professional judgment panels led directly to costing out the “italic”>maximum, not minimum, recommended resource use to achieve the Regents Learning Standards. Thus, ignoring whether the choices would conceivably lead to the desired outcomes, the methodology necessarily produced a biased answer, albeit one that suited the interests of the clients.

The referees seemed unconstrained by any of this logic, however. The state, using S&P’s estimates, had suggested that it was reasonable to concentrate on the spending patterns of the most efficient of the successful schools, those that did well with lower expenditure, and thus excluded the top half of the spending distribution in its calculations. But when the referees attempted to reconcile the state’s recommendation of $1.9 billion with the AIR/MAP estimates of more than five billion dollars, they insisted on adding in all the high-spending districts, even when such districts did not produce better academic outcomes. Thus they forced on S&P an inefficiency standard that, on its face, violates the premise of the successful schools model. After all, the referees reasoned, “there was no evidence whatsoever indicating that the higher spending districts … were in fact inefficient.” In other words, spending more to achieve the same outcomes should not be construed as being inefficient. One might then ask, What would indicate inefficiency?

Perhaps, however, the top-spending districts are using the money for some unmeasured reason. If so, this would only magnify the analytical problem, for if the top-spending districts are not comparable, then their spending level does not indicate what would happen if funds were added to a typical district. It would not reflect the causal effect of added funds on student outcomes, but rather the effects of unknown underlying differences between the districts. But, again, neither AIR/MAP nor the referees made any use of historical data, so no consideration of variations in spending across districts entered their deliberations.

Furthermore, in neither the successful schools nor the professional judgment methodologies is there a sense that the results of the successful districts could be reproduced without instituting a host of reforms (unmentioned by the referees) to ensure that the extra money led to better schools. In fact, the multiplicity of high-spending/low-achievement districts would seem to indicate that money is decidedly not the measure of a good school, that the approach fails on fundamental grounds of science.

To avoid the dead end that both logic and the facts create for costing-out proponents, the referees use a clever bit of language throughout their report. They calculate the amountof annual funding required “to provide all New York City school children the opportunity for a sound basic education”. They never say that the spending they propose will achieve the desired results. Such a statement, or rather, such an omission, clearly suggests that the referees and Judge DeGrasse are not interested in improving student outcomes as much as they are in equalizing opportunities for inefficiency. Unfortunately, doubling the dosage of an ineffective pill seldom provides an effective cure.

 

Just Send the Money

The courts, of course, do not condone wasting funds. In fact, court judgments about school finance frequently contain explicit notes cautioning that the funds will lead to improvements only if they are used effectively. Such tautological statements seldom recognize that New York City (and other states under judgments) have no history of spending funds effectively.

At the same time, the objective is a serious one. The education problems in New York City (and a number of other jurisdictions that face court financing challenges) are real and important. Many people would indeed be willing to put more money into New York City schools (or any poorly performing school for that matter) if they had any reason to believe that students’ achievement would improve significantly.

Unfortunately, addressing these problems by simply augmenting the current system, which has virtually nonexistent performance incentives, will not solve the problems. At such a critical juncture, students and taxpayers alike deserve an approach that embraces the best of what we already know about investments in public schooling that work. This is not ensured by any of the legal proceedings to date.

In the end, the big difficulty with the costing-out exercise is that it purports to provide something that cannot currently be provided: a scientific assessment of what spending is needed to bring about dramatic improvements in student performance. By their very nature such studies provide little information about the costs of achieving improvements efficiently. They contain nary a word about changing the reward structure for teachers (other than paying everybody more). They avoid any consideration of accountability systems based on student outcomes. And they lack any appropriate empirical basis.

Asking the courts or, more precisely, outside consultants to provide a scientific answer to the question of how much should be spent on schools is irresponsible. Decisions on how much to spend on education are not scientific questions, and theycannot be answered with methods that effectively rule out all discussion of reforms that might make the school system more efficient.

Even the weak statement from the New York Court of Appeals that new accountability should accompany added funding was met with indifference by the judicial referees, who accepted the thrust of Mayor Bloomberg’s testimony when he appeared before them: he is already accountable through the electoral system, so just send the money.

-Eric A. Hanushek is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and a member of its Koret Task Force on K–12 Education.

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NEA Sues over NCLB https://www.educationnext.org/neasuesovernclb/ Fri, 23 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.educationnext.org/neasuesovernclb/ The bucks are big, but the case is weak

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Last April, in a move that generated many headlines but surprised almost no one, the National Education Association (NEA) and nine school districts filed a lawsuit against Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings, claiming that federal funding to meet the requirements of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) was inadequate. Although the claim of “unfunded mandate” has been asserted almost since the day NCLB was signed into law, School District of the City of Pontiac et al. v. Spellings constitutes the first major legal challenge to the historic education law to be filed in federal court. If the suit succeeds, the Department of Education (DOE) will be asked to stop enforcing NCLB regulations until sufficient federal funds are provided.

The federal law does have language stating, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to … mandate a state or any subdivision thereof to … incur any costs not paid for under this Act.” While that seems clear enough, isn’t the mandate to teach all children what schools are supposed to do anyway? Or could Pontiac v. Spellings be the ultimate adequacy case, resulting in court-ordered multibillions of dollars? Although many school districts and union leaders would like to think so, a closer look suggests otherwise.

For one thing, the plaintiffs ignore the fact that any state can escape all regulation simply by refusing the money. If NCLB-induced costs actually surpassed the federal revenue flow, then states could simply refuse the money. Though Utah has made noises about such a move, significantly, no state has yet done so.

Further, the plaintiffs in this lawsuit would have to show a real dispute between the school district and the DOE. To prevent federal courts from premature intervention, plaintiffs are normally required to show that all administrative remedies have been pursued before a lawsuit was filed. In this case, there is no allegation that the DOE has refused a district request for a waiver of NCLB requirements. Without such a showing, the court may well refuse even to consider the case.

The NEA’s legal standing is even weaker. Only parties genuinely injured by government action are allowed to bring suit. Since the NEA does not assert that the DOE has acted in a manner that specifically injures the organization, it is hard to see what standing it has in court. While it claims that teachers are being stigmatized, it would be a real stretch to argue that any stigmatization that teachers suffered because their students were not learning constituted an injury that required a legal remedy.

What about the claim that NCLB causes school districts to spend money not provided by the act? The plaintiffs rely on a handful of studies claiming to prove the high cost of accountability, but presumably those studies could be refuted by other studies that would be at least equally convincing. Even if accountability does have some fiscal cost, it will be hard to show that the cost can be uniquely attributed to NCLB. By the time NCLB was signed, the trend toward emphasizing student assessment and accountability had already spread nationwide. Nor are the courts likely to overrule allocations made by the DOE under NCLB rules. Federal courts are generally loath to substitute their judgment for that of the agency entrusted by Congress with the task of administering a statutory program.

In the end, the NEA and the nine school districts that have taken this legal plunge face a difficult task to show that they are the right plaintiffs to bring this suit, at this time, against this agency. Even if they get past the procedural hurdles, substantial factual issues concerning accountability costs will impede their journey. Even if they overcome all these barriers, the plaintiffs must persuade a federal court to enjoin the DOE’s administration of NCLB simply because school districts say they need more money. That refrain, more money, is one that has been heard countless times before, by legislators, policymakers, and the courts. Without the proper legal basis, this particular version of the song is not likely to resonate.

John R. Munich and Rocco E. Testani are partners in the Education, Government and Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, LLP.

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Looking in the Wrong Place https://www.educationnext.org/looking-in-the-wrong-place/ Fri, 23 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.educationnext.org/looking-in-the-wrong-place/ As the proverbial story goes, a drunk, when asked where he had lost his keys, pointed off in the darkness, far from the lamppost under which he was searching. “But the light’s better here,” he explained. So it is with the new federal study of charter schools. That study plans to look at 50 middle ... Read more

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As the proverbial story goes, a drunk, when asked where he had lost his keys, pointed off in the darkness, far from the lamppost under which he was searching. “But the light’s better here,” he explained.

So it is with the new federal study of charter schools. That study plans to look at 50 middle schools (and, perhaps, some older students at elementary schools), despite the fact that, according to our estimates based on data from the Center for Education Reform, only about 20% of the country’s 3,400 charter schools are middle schools or have a middle school plus high school design; the rest serve students beginning in kindergarten or 9th grade. Even worse, two studies presented in this issue of Education Next appear to confirm what intuition suggests: charter schools are most effective for students who enter at an early age.

It’s cheaper to look at middle-school kids, says the federal contractor, Mathematica Policy Research (MPR). By focusing on middle school, one can simply use the statewide data on a child’s performance on tests for students in grades 3 through 8, as mandated by No Child Left Behind. For a solid study of elementary schools, MPR would have to administer its own tests.

In other words, the middle schools are where the cheap light is. Never mind that most kids are elsewhere.

Of course, no single study will ever tell us about all charter schools, because charters are inherently diverse. It no longer seems odd to encounter under the same moniker military schools and peace schools, schools for dancers and schools for those who have broken the law, boarding schools and schools that exist only in cyberspace. Indeed, that was the original intention: to free schools from suffocating regulation and give parents choices.

So it is ironic that the media treat charters as identical as they zero in on one overriding question: do students attending them learn more than students attending traditional public schools?

The issue is becoming all-consuming. Beginning with the New York Times’s front-page splash about an American Federation of Teachers (AFT) study in August of 2004 (“Nation’s Charter Schools Lagging Behind, U.S. Test Scores Reveal”), it seems that every study, no matter how problematic, has spawned a headline, simply because it talks about charters’ effects on test scores.

Many studies, including the AFT one, are inherently suspect, inasmuch as they look only at student achievement levels at a single point in time, thereby telling us little or nothing about how much pupils are learning.

MPR, to its credit, plans to follow students over time. Unfortunately, by focusing mainly on the middle school, it is still headed down the wrong track.

Two high-quality studies presented in this issue of Education Next highlight the seriousness of the matter. In the research section, Caroline Hoxby and Jonah Rockoff use a randomized experiment research design to evaluate three Chicago charter schools. Because these charters held a lottery to select their students, the research team could compare the achievement of applicants who were admitted with a similar group who remained in a traditional public school. The researchers found strong, positive effects of the charter school experience for younger children.

By contrast, Robert Bifulco and Helen Ladd, use data from North Carolina to compare the test score gains of students in charter schools with their previous gains in traditional public schools. Students entering charter schools in grades 4–8 fell behind as a result of the move.

One explanation for differing results from the two studies is that they simply studied different schools. The more interesting possibility is that together they show charters to be most effective when they receive children at an early age.

It is thus unfortunate that the projected federal study of charters, unless quickly redesigned, will focus primarily on middle schools. Like the drunk, the feds are searching in the wrong place, simply because one light bulb is cheaper than another. The country could be left just as much in the dark at the end of the study as it is today.

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Getting the Right Principals https://www.educationnext.org/gettingtherightprincipals/ Fri, 23 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.educationnext.org/gettingtherightprincipals/ Educating principals; unflagging the SATs; charter schools; more Mel Levine; the inequity of adequacy

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Getting the Right Principals

I just finished reading “The Accidental Principal” by Frederick Hess and Andrew Kelly (Features, Summer 2005), with great interest and agreement. I have been in public education for 33 years, 4 of them as an adjunct professor in education administration. When I’d had all I could take of exactly what Hess and Kelly described in their article, I quit. I felt there were better ways to affect the system.

It had become painfully clear that teacher colleges were more concerned with covering everything required by the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) than with preparing good school administrators. Many times I saw the great frustration of other professors who were interrupting good learning to “cover” NCATE standards.

It’s exactly what I see in all our schools, where administrators are more concerned with jumping through all the hoops than with educating kids. Perhaps it’s time to admit that central planning isn’t working any better in education than it did in the Soviet Union.

Dr. Steve Wyckoff
Educational Services and
Staff Development Association
of Central Kansas

Hutchinson, Kansa

 

Unflagged and Unequal

When the College Board stopped flagging the SAT scores of students who took the tests with accommodations (most commonly, extended time) in 2004, it instituted a tightened eligibility process to offset the new stigma-free advantage.

In his examination of the 2003 and 2004 SAT I results, both flagged and unflagged (“Unflagged SATs,” Features, Summer 2005), Samuel J. Abrams found that the eligibility process became a hidden advantage for students whose parents and schools were more skilled at meeting tightened eligibility requirements—documentation from therapists and psychologists—than families “less savvy and less financially endowed.”

Indeed, the increase in the scores of students with accommodations in the District of Columbia is dramatic, and Abrams attributes the anomaly to the division between extremes of wealth within the District. But he is not quite correct. The extremes are there, but they are within the entire metropolitan area, including the Maryland and Virginia suburbs. Many of the students living in these richer areas attend private schools in D.C. and contribute to the high scores in the city.

More significantly, on these schools’ college counseling web pages there are links to the College Board’s “site for students with disabilities” as well as other disability sources. The web site of Georgetown Day School has a four-page Learning Disabilities section that includes a detailed list of the categories of professionals who can diagnose LD and ADHD.

By contrast, many of the public high schools don’t even have web sites.

Unflagging the scores in 2004 tilted the playing field to the advantage of parents most skilled at working the system; the high number of flagged scores in 2003 suggests that the College Board saw stigma where sophisticated parents saw advantage. The stiffened eligibility process increased their advantage at the expense of the less skilled, when it created a de facto double standard.

Erich Martel
Teacher, World History and AP U.S. history
Woodrow Wilson H.S.
Washington, D.C.

 

Mel Levine’s Brain

It is unfortunate that Dr. Daniel Willingham took a rather superficial view of our work in reviewing Dr. Mel Levine’s most recent popular press books for his article “Mind over Matter” (Check the Facts, Spring 2005). Both books, A Mind at a Time and The Myth of Laziness, were intended to describe Dr. Levine’s neurodevelopmental framework for a general audience and provide examples from his clinical cases; they were not intended to describe the research base on which Dr. Levine’s neurodevelopmental framework is founded.

Those who read Dr. Levine’s entire body of work carefully will find that it is rooted in rigorous scientific research as well as sound clinical judgment and experience. Dr. Levine has developed and refined an accurate and usable framework of the mind and its functions. His 1992 book, Developmental Variation and Learning Disorders, was written for a more academic audience and includes citations of the research, theory, and clinical experience on which his framework is based. Dr. Levine’s theoretical framework is based on existing research from across a variety of scientific and academic disciplines as well as the convergence of clinical evidence and experience. Some of Dr. Willingham’s misunderstanding may be the inevitable result of the wide gap that often separates clinical studies and frontline experience from research in a field like cognitive psychology. In addition, different disciplines that study learning vary significantly in their terminology and conceptual models.

At All Kinds of Minds [a research organization established by Dr. Levine] our continual goal is to use our theoretical framework to help those who have an immediate need: the students who struggle to learn and the parents, teachers, and clinicians who strive to help them achieve success in school and in life. Many critical clinical problems have not been rigorously researched. Nevertheless, they need to be addressed vigorously using the best possible judgment by educators and clinicians. To date, the feedback we have received from thousands of teachers and parents is that our programs make a dramatic difference in their lives.

The All Kinds of Minds Institute is committed to rigorous, high-quality research. Over the past three years, All Kinds of Minds has made a multi­million-dollar investment in building our research infrastructure and fielding three national independent research studies. In addition, several small-scale independent studies have already found that the Schools Attuned program has a positive impact on student and teacher outcomes. In the coming years we will continue to solicit input from the scientific, clinical, and education communities to inform the further development of our programs. We invite the academic research community to study our framework and programs thoroughly. We will carefully vet and incorporate all appropriate emerging research into our theoretical framework and programs.

Ann E. Harman
Director of Research
All Kinds of Minds Institute

Daniel Willingham replies: Harman suggests that Levine’s popular press books are reader-friendly versions of a much more substantial scientific theory. That is a misrepresentation; Levine’s “scientific” work is not better supported than his popular books. As I noted in my article, I called the All Kinds of Minds Institute specifically to ask for more research-oriented publications and was directed to (among others) Developmental Variation and Learning Disorders, to which Harman refers (although I read the 1999 second edition, not the first edition she mentions). I pointed out that these works do indeed have more references to the scientific literature, but only for well-accepted ideas (which I did not criticize), and none for the particular views Levine espouses (which I did). The second edition also happens to be the source of Levine’s complete misinterpretation of research by Richard McKee and Larry Squire that I discussed.

Harman’s second point is that cognitive psychologists might view the mind differently than clinicians. It is not clear to me how that point absolves clinicians from providing data to support their views, particularly when their views conflict with existing data.

Finally, Harman notes that several small studies have found that the Schools Attuned program “has a positive effect on student and teacher outcomes.” She might have added that these studies have not undergone expert peer review, nor do they compare Schools Attuned with competitor methods. To the extent that they show student effects, they show that Schools Attuned is better than nothing. I applaud the interest All Kinds of Minds has taken in evaluating the program, but I dispute that existing research has shown much of anything, least of all that the program is ready for statewide support.

 

Charter School Melee

Ted Sizer and Michael Petrilli illustrate what makes education policy such an interesting field (“Identity Crisis,” Forum, Summer 2005). The fellow writing for the “right” (Petrilli) argues for state involvement, while the fellow representing the “left” (Sizer) objects to a strong exercise of federal power.

It’s a compelling discussion that avoids two of the more frustrating positions in debates about these issues: testing is all that matters or there are not actually serious problems in American education.

But even this debate seems to obscure the potential for reasonable compromise. Sizer is right about the possible excesses of No Child Left Behind—style accountability, though it’s worth noting that these issues predate the law. However, is Petrilli’s plea for basic literacy and numeracy standards too much to ask? And, even in practice, is it really at odds with the rich notion of education that Sizer has long championed and in fact not something of a predicate for it?

The problem with the direction Sizer wants is that, for a variety of reasons, good intentions and localized accountability have proved an insufficient guarantee of equity for underserved students. In many walks of life, people are held accountable to external standards. Is education really so exceptional among American endeavors that it needs no such outside accountability?

Within both the traditional public and charter sectors there are schools that serve niche populations and do not lend themselves to the mainstream accountability system. However, these schools are a minority. Instead of arguing whether charter schools should be included in No Child Left Behind, a more fruitful question is how to ensure that state accountability schemes allow enough flexibility for boutique programs within the public system while not opening up loopholes that low-quality schools can slip through. That’s a key issue for Congress to consider during the next reauthorization of No Child.

Apart from giving new start-ups an initial period of time to establish themselves, it is appropriate to hold the average charter school, serving similar students, to the same standards as other public schools in that community. If those standards are overly prescriptive or otherwise unreasonable, that’s an issue for all schools, not a reason to carve out exceptions for charters. Rhetorically, charter foes consistently fail to note that charters are public schools; charter proponents should not substantively make the same omission.

Andrew J. Rotherham
Director of Education Policy
and Senior Fellow

Progressive Policy Institut

 

The Inequity of Adequacy

Much appreciated is Joe Williams’s excellent account of the fiscal-equity juggernaut that has rolled through New York State (“The Legal Cash Machine,” Features, Summer 2005). The depressing results that are sure to follow from this ill-advised lawsuit will be equally unwelcome.

The tragedy of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity (CFE) lawsuit is that it has resulted in mindless simplification of all debate surrounding education. By making more spending the only path to better results, we forgo the more important discussions of how, for instance, better pedagogy might improve outcomes, or how better management can direct more money to classrooms by creating transportation and procurement efficiencies.

The promise of what seems to be unlimited funds on the horizon has also created a “we can have it all” mentality. We can pay teachers more and also have more teachers (even though the number of qualified teachers in the job pool is a very finite commodity). We can build new schoolhouses rather than more efficiently use the ones we already have. We can increase available technology regardless of the capacity of the schools, their staff, and their students to absorb it. The sky is the limit. Don’t worry. The new money will be here soon.

As recounted by Mr. Williams, the lawsuit began during a period when city schools were indeed being shortchanged in the allocation of state funds. But the shortchanging of the city by about $400 per student 15 years ago is ancient history. Both the state’s and the city’s share of education funding in New York City have skyrocketed. Education outcomes are still mixed.

Finally, in New York City, as Williams made clear, the drumbeat continues for the State of New York to assume the full $5.6 billion annual school funding increase. But few in Gotham seem to realize that beyond the sphere of economic influence and affluence of the city is a world of dire economic crisis: boarded-up strip malls lining the upstate highways and byways and devastated cities with crippled economies, unable to support their own schools, much less subsidize ours. At the same time, these are the districts that are already eyeing the CFE lawsuit as a model for their own fiscal ambitions. All will discover that there is no pot of gold buried outside Albany.

Andrew Wolf
Columnist
The New York Sun

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